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•  Migrants can help to build social and business networks that improve the quality of 
information flowing between countries and lower the costs of international trade and 
investment. This may particularly benefit Australia, which has a large and growing 
migrant population. 
•  The patterns of trade and investment across the OECD suggest that migrant 
networks are important. Countries tend to trade and invest more with countries from 
which they have received more migrants and, at least for trade, this relationship 
appears to be stronger where information barriers like distance and language would 
otherwise more greatly inhibit trade. 
•  This does not necessarily mean that countries with more migrants should be 
expected to trade and invest much more in total. This study finds that, by lowering 
the cost of trade between a pair of countries, migrants appear to reduce trade with 
other countries so that the overall effect on aggregate trade seems quite small. By 
contrast, there was no strong evidence that a reduction in investment with other 
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1 Introduction 
Migrants affect many aspects of the community and economy in which they live. 
Some of the direct economic effects of migrants living within Australia were 
described in the Productivity Commission’s (2006) report on the Economic Impacts 
of Migration and Population Growth. That report showed that migrants tend to raise 
Australian living standards — measured as GDP per capita — somewhat, because 
Australia’s migrants are more highly skilled than the locally-born population on 
average and more concentrated in working age groups. This paper focuses on a less 
direct way in which migrants may affect living standards: by strengthening 
international social and business networks, thereby facilitating trade and investment 
flows. 
Economies are integrating and becoming more closely interdependent. The past few 
decades have seen rapid growth in the international movement of goods and factors 
of production. Trade grew half as fast again as world output during the 1990s and 
the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) grew twice as fast as trade. The 
international movement of people is another important feature of this integrated 
global economy. The declining cost of travel and communications has lowered 
information barriers and encouraged migration across national borders (figure 1.1). 













25 Foreign direct investment (per cent of GDP, LHS)
Merchandise trade (per cent of GDP, LHS)
Migrants (per cent of population, RHS)
 
Data source:  Author’s calculations based on UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2006 and World Bank, 
World Development Indicators, 2006.     




Migration has been especially important for Australia. The proportion of migrants 
in the Australian population has risen since the Second World War through 
successive waves of migration from Europe and, later, Asia. Today, almost one in 
four Australians was born overseas, a larger share than in any other OECD country. 
Australians are also emigrating in larger numbers, and today around 350,000 
Australian-born people reside in other OECD countries. Meanwhile, both 
Australia’s trade and foreign investment have increased steadily, as a proportion of 
GDP, in recent decades (figure 1.2 and appendix A). 
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Data source: Author’s calculations based on UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2006 and World Bank, 
World Development Indicators, 2006. 
These trends raise the question of whether migrants have, by strengthening business 
networks between countries, boosted the volume of international trade and 
investment undertaken by firms in their country of residence and country of birth. It 
seems plausible that stronger networks would make it faster, simpler and less risky 
to do business across borders and thereby ease the flow of merchandise across the 
docks and help to identify investment opportunities abroad. Recent discussion of the 
untapped potential of Australia’s expatriate population, or ‘diaspora’, has 
particularly focused on this role: 
Expatriates can contribute to their home country by influencing trade, investment and 
philanthropic flows, connecting local organisations to international developments and 
opportunities, and projecting a contemporary national image. … Some of these benefits 
are already flowing to Australia. A logical approach for our country, which is small in 
population and physically isolated, is to try to capture more of these benefits … by 
engaging more comprehensively with our diaspora. (Fullilove and Flutter 2004, p. viii)     
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If migrants and expatriates were to strengthen these networks, and this had the 
effect of boosting the aggregate volume of international trade and investment, then 
there are clear economic benefits. An expanding literature shows that when 
countries trade more, their productivity and living standards tend to rise (Frankel 
and Romer 1999, Alcalá and Ciccone 2004, Redding and Venables 2004, Romalis 
2007). This may occur for many reasons. Trade allows countries to specialise in 
production of those goods to which they are most suited and this specialisation may 
also permit economies of scale in production. Trade also increases competition 
between producers which tends to raise productivity by making inefficient 
production methods both more obvious and costly to managers (Winston 1993), or 
simply by driving those firms that happen to have low productivity out of business 
(Syverson 2004). Similarly, foreign investment often brings with it foreign 
technology, skills and managerial know-how that not only result in high 
productivity and wages within the foreign-owned firms (for example, Caves 1974), 
but also spill over to raise the productivity of domestic competitors (Haskel et al. 
2002, Keller and Yeaple 2003). 
International trade and investment may bring greater benefits to small countries, 
such as Australia. Small countries face more acute trade-offs between economies of 
scale and competition. They are also more reliant upon knowledge developed 
overseas than are larger developed countries. Given the large and growing number 
of migrants within Australia and the importance of trade and investment for the 
Australian economy, an understanding of their interconnections is particularly 
valuable. 
1.1  What is already known? 
Some evidence that countries trade and invest more with countries from which they 
have received more migrants is provided by figure 1.3. Panel a plots the level of 
bilateral merchandise trade between OECD countries and all trading partners for 
which data are available, against the size of migrant populations living within these 
OECD countries. Similarly, panel b plots the stock of bilateral foreign direct 
investment against the size of migrant populations within OECD countries. These 
data have been normalised by dividing trade flows and foreign investment by the 
size of each trading partner’s GDP and by dividing the number of migrants by the 
size of each country’s population. Both charts show a strong upward trend.     




Figure 1.3 Bilateral  trade,  investment  and migrant populations, 2000 
28 OECD countries and up to 162 partner countriesa 



















































a Trade data are the sum of merchandise imports and merchandise exports, investment data are the sum of 
inward investment stocks and outward investments stocks while migrant data are the size of migrant 
populations within OECD countries. Trade and investment data are normalised by dividing by the size of both 
partner countries’ GDP, while migrant populations are normalised by dividing by the size of both countries’ 
populations. The data are expressed as logarithms and zero trade, investment and migrant population data 
are ignored. Lines of best fit are shown and both slopes are statistically different from zero at conventional 
significance levels. 
Data source: As discussed in chapter 2. 
Of course, these rudimentary scatter-plots ignore many factors that affect trade 
between countries. Important determinants of trade and investment may include 
transport costs, tariffs and the alternative opportunities that countries have to trade 
and invest elsewhere in the world. There are growing literatures attempting to 
identify more carefully the role that migrants play in facilitating trade and 
investment between their country of residence and country of birth. 
The trade literature, in particular, has consistently found that larger numbers of 
migrants are strongly associated with larger flows of goods between the migrants’ 
country of residence and country of birth. However, estimates of the size of these 
effects vary widely (table 1.1). At one end of the range, Gould’s (1994) results 
imply that increasing the number of migrants living in the United States from a 
given country by 1 per cent would increase trade with that country by only 0.01 or 
0.02 percentage points. At the other end, Dunlevy’s (2006) results imply that this 
would increase trade by almost 0.4 percentage points.  
A problem with some previous studies is that they do not control for characteristics 
of trading pairs that may affect bilateral trade and migration. The most reliable 
estimates to date come from a study (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2006) that controls for 
all important characteristics of trading pairs that are constant over time by looking     
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at growth in the international exports of US states over the course of the 1990s. That 
study showed that exports to the migrants’ country of birth tend to rise by around 
0.13 per cent when the number of migrants in a state rises by 1 per cent. This was 
shown to be roughly half the effect that would have been estimated from 
cross-sectional analysis of the level of trade, though the precise reason for this 
difference was not determined. 
The literature linking FDI and migration is scarcer, more recent and its implications 
are less clear (table 1.2). Both cross-sectional and time-series analyses of foreign 
investment out of the United States (Javorcik et al. 2006 and Bhattacharya and 
Groznik 2005) suggest that FDI rises by around 0.3 per cent when the number of 
migrants increases by 1  per  cent. However, it is not yet clear how these results 
would carry over to other countries because the only previous study of the effects of 
migrants residing outside the United States, Buch et al. (2003), found widely 
varying results depending upon how their migrant population data were constructed. 
Evidence from foreign case studies is consistent with the empirical finding that 
migrants are associated with greater bilateral trade and investment. Ethnic Indians 
working in Silicon Valley, for example, facilitated the development of a large ICT 
service export industry in India, by improving business networks and establishing a 
reputation for Indian ICT workers (Saxenian 2002). Similarly, expatriate Chinese 
business people have facilitated foreign investment into the Chinese manufacturing 
industry (Weidenbaum and Hughes 1996). 
Concrete evidence is hard to find on the effects of Australian migrants on trade and 
investment, though surveys are consistent with the hypothesis that migration 
strengthens business ties with the migrants’ countries of birth. Those companies in 
Australia that successfully export to East Asia are more than three times as likely as 
other businesses to employ staff of East Asian descent (Dawkins et al. 1995). 
Similarly, follow-up surveys of migrants entering Australia with Business Skills 
Visas in the 1990s show that companies they established after arrival exported 
significantly more than other Australian companies of a similar age (Access 
Economics 1998). Australia’s expatriate networks may also play a role. Surveys 
show that one Australian expatriate in five believes they have established business 
and trade links during their time abroad (Hugo et al. 2003). 
In summary, while the magnitude of the effects that migrants have on trade and 
investment may be debated, casual inspection of the available data and the results of 
the literature to date suggest that migrants tend to increase trade and investment 
flows between their country of residence and country of birth.     




1.2  What does this paper say and do? 
This paper builds on these previous studies. The main difference is that it examines 
migration, trade and investment between many countries, whereas previous studies 
have typically looked at migrants living within a single country, most commonly 
within the United States. Migrant populations in each of 28 OECD countries, 
defined as foreign-born populations enumerated in each country’s census, are 
compared with bilateral merchandise trade flows and bilateral stocks of foreign 
investment around the year 2000. 
Looking at migration, trade and investment patterns across many countries has 
several advantages over studies of a single country. 
•  The effects of migrants are estimated more robustly than in some previous 
studies because the larger dataset means it is possible to include dummy 
variables that control for the unique characteristics of trading partners that affect 
how much they trade and invest and how many migrants they receive. 
•  The effects of migrants are estimated more robustly than in some previous 
studies because the analysis controls for some important characteristics of 
trading pairs. 
•  The role played by migrants in overcoming information barriers is explored. 
•  The effects of migrants on a country’s total international trade and investment 
are estimated.  
•  Finally, the results average across the idiosyncratic experiences of individual 
countries and so are likely more widely applicable. 
The second point deserves further discussion, though the fourth point is the paper’s 
main innovation. The results of Bandyopadhay et al. (2006) discussed above 
showed that cross-sectional analysis produces biased estimates of the effects of 
migrants on trade, presumably because of the omission of variables that are 
correlated with both migrant populations and trade. The current paper suggests a 
possible explanation. It shows that an important variable omitted from many 
previous analyses is the size of expatriate communities. The paper shows that the 
size of migrant and expatriate communities are positively correlated across the 
OECD and that ignoring the size of expatriate communities appears to bias upwards 
estimates of the effects of migrants on both trade and investment. 
By taking account of the role of expatriate communities, the paper finds that a 
1 per cent increase in the number of migrants increases trade between their country 
of residence and country of birth by 0.09 per cent, and that this is roughly half the 
effect that would be estimated if the size of expatriate communities was ignored. 
Similar analysis of foreign investment suggests that a 1  per  cent increase in the     
  INTRODUCTION  7
 
number of migrants increases investment between their country of residence and 
country of birth by around 0.15 per cent.  
The paper’s main departure from the previous literature, however, is to consider the 
effects that migrants have on a country’s total trade flows and investment stocks. 
Migrants have previously been shown to increase trade and investment between 
their country of residence and country of birth, but this paper makes the first attempt 
to understand how that additional bilateral trade and investment comes about. 
The standard ‘gravity model’ of trade assumes that the total volume of trade, adding 
up trade both within and between countries, is determined by the size of the 
economies involved and by the costs associated with trade between locations. For 
given levels of output in each country, relative trade costs determine the pattern of 
trade (for example, Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). If migrants are effective in 
lowering the cost of trade between their country of residence and country of birth, 
bilateral trade between the two countries will tend to increase with migration. 
However, as well as a ‘trade creation’ effect, there will be a kind of ‘trade 
diversion’ effect — the additional bilateral trade that migrants create may come at 
the expense of either internal trade within countries or international trade with other 
countries. On balance, the total international trade of the migrants’ country of 
residence and country of birth should increase with migration, as should the total 
international trade of the world as a whole. However, the effects on total trade flows 
may well be quite small, particularly for countries with many nearby trading 
partners. 
Theories of foreign direct investment are more complex and the overall effects of 
migrants may depend upon the nature of the investment. On the one hand, if 
migrants encourage vertical investment as part of a production chain that serves the 
source country’s markets then the choice to locate the plant in one country may 
mean relocating the plant from another country. On the other hand, if migrants 
encourage horizontal investment to serve the host country’s markets then it does not 
clearly come at the expense of investment elsewhere.  
In practice, it seems likely that most of the effect that migrants have on investment 
between their country of residence and country of birth does not come at the 
expense of investment into other countries. Foreign direct investment appears to be 
mainly horizontal with two-thirds of US affiliate sales going to the host country, 
while only 10 per cent of sales are back to the source country (Blonigen 2005). 
Further, the very rapid expansion of foreign direct investment through the 1980s 
and 1990s suggests that, at least at that time, many profitable investment 
opportunities were yet to be exploited.     




Scatter-plots tell a story consistent with these conjectures. Figure 1.4, panel a, plots 
the ‘openness to trade’ of OECD countries, measured as merchandise imports plus 
exports as a share of GDP, against the share of migrants within their populations, 
while panel b shows a similar plot of foreign direct investment against migrant 
populations. There is a clear upward trend in the latter chart, but no discernible 
trend in the former. That is, those OECD countries that have larger numbers of 
migrants as a share of their population do not appear to trade more but do appear to 
engage in more foreign direct investment. 
Figure 1.4 Aggregate  trade,  investment and migrant populations, 2000a 
28 OECD countries 



















































a Trade data are the sum of merchandise imports and merchandise exports divided by that country’s GDP, 
investment data are the sum of inward investment stocks and outward investments stocks divided by that 
country’s GDP, while migrant data are the size of migrant populations divided by the population of their 
country of residence. The data are expressed as logarithms. Lines of best fit are shown; only the slope in 
panel b is statistically different from zero at conventional significance levels. 
Data source: As discussed in chapter 2 
Of course, these charts ignore many important factors that affect aggregate levels of 
trade and investment. The paper explores the stories suggested by these scatter-plots 
in a number of ways. 
•  The analysis of bilateral trade and investment is extended by including in the 
analysis the effect of the total number of migrants resident in a country. The 
results suggest that essentially all of the bilateral increase in trade due to 
migrants comes about by reducing trade with other countries. However, there is 
not strong evidence that the bilateral increase in investment due to migrants 
results from reducing investment with other countries. 
•  The aggregate openness of a country to trade is related to total migrant 
populations. Estimates suggest that increasing the total migrant population by 
1 per cent increases openness to trade by only 0.03 per cent, an effect that is     
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statistically not different from zero. Compared to the previously-estimated 
bilateral elasticity of 0.09, this suggests that at least two-thirds of the bilateral 
increase in trade comes about by reducing trade with other countries. 
•  The theory underpinning the gravity equation is applied to calculate the effects 
of increasing the number of migrants on trade between all OECD countries. The 
results suggest that, depending upon the country of residence considered, 
between 20 and 80 per cent of the bilateral increase in trade due to migrants 
results from reducing trade with other countries. 
While these different approaches produce quite different results, the overall 
conclusion is that migrants have a much larger effect on bilateral trade than on 
aggregate trade volumes. This suggests that the consequences of immigration and 
emigration for productivity and living standards through their effects on 
international business and social networks are more nuanced than they may have 
previously appeared. 
A general caveat applies to the results in this paper. The cross-sectional nature of 
the available data makes it difficult to infer a causal connection and strictly the 
results only establish correlation. That is, the results do not strictly show that 
migrants cause an increase in the trade flows and investment between their country 
of residence and country of birth, but rather they show that where countries have in 
the past exchanged more migrants they are today engaging in more trade and 
investment with each other. However, it seems plausible that causality may run 
from migrants to trade flows, and this is a common assumption in the previous 
literature. The accumulation of migrants over past decades is likely to be affected 
more by migration policy, wage differentials and the existing size of migrant 
communities rather than potential trading and investment opportunities today.1 
                                              
1 Only one previous study (Javorcik et al. 2006) used an instrumental variable approach, finding 
that migrant populations caused an increase in the stock of foreign investment to a similar degree 
as would have been estimated in the absence of instrumentation. In that study, the numbers of 
migrants residing in the United States were instrumented using the numbers of migrants living in 
the European Union, population density in the migrant’s country of birth, the cost of obtaining a 
passport and legal restrictions on emigration. This approach could not be used in the current 
study because country dummy variables are included.  
 











Bilateral migrants     
Gould (1994)a  US trade with 47 countries,
1970-1986 
0.02*** 0.01***  Larger effects for consumer goods, 





0.03  0.12   Between Canadian provinces  Helliwell  
(1997) b 
Trade between Canadian provinces 
and US states, 1990  0.34***  0.06  Between Canadian provinces and 
US states 
None None 
Head & Ries 
(1998)a 
Canadian trade with 136 countries, 
1980-92 
0.10***  0.31***  Larger effects for independent 
migrants (mostly professionals) 









US trade with 17 countries, 
1870-1910 
0.08** 0.29***    Relative  price 
indices; population 
None 
-0.08 0.06  Commonwealth  countries  Girma & Yu 
(2002)c 
UK trade with 48 countries, 
1981-93  0.50*** 0.19  Non-Commonwealth  countries 
Remoteness 
(average distance to 




0.22*** 0.05  1978  Combes et al.  
(2003)b 
Trade between 95 French 
departments, 1978 and 1993  0.22*** 0.13***  1993 
None None 
 
Wagner et al. 
(2002) 
Trade between 5 Canadian regions 
and 160 countries, 1992-95 
0.08* 0.25***    Remoteness 
(average reciprocal 
of the distance to 
world GDP) 




Trade between Spain and 40 
countries, 1991-98. 






Bryant et al. (2004)  Trade between New Zealand 
and around 170 countries, 
1981-2001 
0.09*** 0.15*** Larger effects excluding agricultural 
exports and oil imports 
Population  None (but correlated 
random effects by 
country) 
0.24*** West  coast  Bardhan & 
Guhathakurta 
(2004) 
Exports from the United 
States to 51 countries, 




Co, Euzent & 
Martin (2004) 
Exports from 51 US states 
(and DC) to 28 countries, 
1993 










Exports from 51 US states 





 Smaller  effects  after controlling for 
ancestry, larger effects for 
countries with poorer institutions, 
larger effects for consumer goods 
than producer goods 
Remoteness 
(average distance to 
world GDP)  
None 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2006) 
Exports from 51 US states 
(and DC) to 29 countries 
(1988-92 and 1998-2002) 
0.13**    Migrant links to trade appear to be 
due to a small number of ethnic 
groups 
Population Trading-pair 
Dunlevy (2006)  Exports from 51 US states 
(and DC) to 87 countries at a 
single point in time (average 
1990-92) 
0.39***    Larger effect for exports to 
countries with corrupt political 
systems, smaller effect with 
Spanish or English speaking 
countries 
None  State and country 
Ethnic Chinese  networks   
0.21  0.21  Bilateral trade in homogeneous 
goods  
Rauch & Trindade 
(1999)a 
Trade between 63 countries, 
1980 and 1990 
0.47***  0.47***  Bilateral trade in differentiated 
goods 
Remoteness 
(average distance to 
world GDP); GDP 
per capita 
EEC and EFTA 
a Elasticities are calculated by Wagner, Head and Reis (2002). b Immigrant and expatriate populations are both included in regression equations c Elasticities are from 
the regression specification including a lagged dependent variable. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels.  
 
Table 1.2  Previous literature on FDI and migration 
 
















Migrant stocks are constructed based on 
flows since 1974 and the results differ 
depending on whether gross migration or 





US FDI stock into 33 
countries 
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 
0.33*** 
 
  Panel multivariate regression Openness Trading-pair 




  Cross-sectional bi-variate regression None None 
Javorcik et al.  
(2006) 
US FDI stock into 56 
countries, 1990 and 2000 
0.28* 
 
  Higher elasticity to tertiary educated 
migrants (0.37**)
Population  Noneb 
Kugler & Rapoport 
(2007)c 
US FDI outflows between







  Dependent variable is growth in foreign
investment stocks between 1990 and 2000; 
elasticities are reported for migrants with 
different educational attainment as 
indicated
Not applicable Regional 
Ethnic Chinese networks 
Tong (2005)  FDI stocks between 70 
countries around 1990 
0.21***  0.21***  Higher elasticities for investment from 
developed countries and to countries with 






a Regressions are undertaken in levels not logarithms and the elasticities reported here are the current author’s estimates based on data for the means of the 37-country 
sample in 2000. b This study does not employ country fixed-effects in the study of aggregate foreign investment stocks, but does in a separate analysis of sectoral 
investment.  c These elasticities are for the effect of 1990 migrant numbers on growth in FDI over the following decade. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1, 5 and 10 per cent levels.     




2 Estimation  approach 
This chapter sets out: the theory of how migrants may affect trade and investment 
by overcoming information barriers between countries; the patterns that should be 
apparent in the data if this occurs; and the modelling approach to be used. 
2.1  How may migrants affect trade and investment? 
Migrants may facilitate the development of social and business networks that 
improve the quality of information flowing between countries and encourage trade 
and investment flows. At a macroeconomic level, two well-known puzzles hint at 
the important role of social networks in international economic relations. 
The first puzzle is that distance appears to matter too much, both for trade and for 
investment. An expansive literature finds that a 1 per cent increase in the distance 
separating countries reduces trade between the two countries by around 0.9 per cent 
(Disdier and Head 2007). In terms of transport costs alone, this seems an 
unreasonably large effect. If transport costs were typically 5 per cent of the value of 
traded goods then Grossman (1998) calculates that a 1  per  cent increase in the 
distance separating countries should lower trade volumes by only 0.03 per cent. 
For investment patterns, the role of distance is even more surprising. Early theories 
explained investment in terms of differences in factor endowments that lead to 
vertical investment (Helpman 1984) or transport cost savings from production close 
to consumer markets that lead to horizontal investment (Markusen 1984). While 
distance hampers vertical integration of plants across countries, the larger transport 
cost savings should encourage horizontal investment and, as mentioned in the 
introduction, horizontal FDI appears to be the predominant type. This suggests that 
foreign investment may be expected to increase with distance between the source 
and host countries, yet in practice FDI falls away rapidly. 
The second puzzle is commonly called the ‘border puzzle’. Trade between countries 
is a small fraction of trade within countries. Even after accounting for distance and 
associated transport costs, trade between countries is 20 to 50 per cent lower than 
trade within countries (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). In fact, for trade between 
typical countries, these border effects are more than 3 times as important as actual     




transport charges (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004). Similarly, foreign investment 
is a small fraction of domestic investment. 
The most plausible explanation for both puzzles is that information on foreign 
trading and investment opportunities, and the associated legal and regulatory 
environments, is both scarce and expensive to gather, and that search costs increase 
not only with distance, but also with national borders (Rauch 1999, 2001).  
Information may be even more important for FDI than it is for international trade. 
Where traders may interact with foreigners at arms length, investors engage more 
closely with a wide range of people (suppliers, workers, government officials) and 
need more detailed knowledge of local labour markets, legal and regulatory 
environments. At the same time, the risks involved with experimenting to gain 
information are potentially larger. While trade can involve low fixed costs 
(establishing distribution networks) but large variable costs (transport), direct 
investment often requires a large upfront commitment of resources (plant 
establishment), which is partially sunk. 
Migrant communities may offer several ways of improving information flows by 
strengthening business and social networks between the migrant’s country of 
residence and country of birth. Migrants are well placed to act as middlemen on 
account of their superior language skills, and their knowledge of consumer 
preferences, business practices, market structure and laws. Multi-national 
corporations may use scouting teams to identify potential investments that include 
foreign-born staff (Bhattacharya and Groznik 2005). Finally, the importance of 
reputation within these business networks may provide foreign business people with 
greater certainty of contract delivery in countries in which they have difficulty 
enforcing contracts through the legal system. 
If migrants increase trade flows by overcoming information barriers, then certain 
patterns of correlations should emerge in the data. First, migrants should be 
associated with greater trade between their country of residence and their country of 
birth and the effect should be similar for trade in both directions. If, for example, 
migrants were associated with only higher imports into their country of residence, 
but not exports, then this may indicate simply that they are importing goods for 
personal consumption, because their tastes favour goods produced in their country 
of birth. Second, migrants should be more strongly associated with trade between 
pairs of countries for which alternative business and social networks are weaker. 
For example, migrant networks may play a larger role between countries that do not 
share common languages or have colonial ties or well-developed business networks 
or simply between countries that are far apart. Third, migrants should increase trade 
more strongly in goods for which information is more valuable because quality 
varies significantly between suppliers. Fourth, migrant networks may play a larger     




role where one of the trading partners has poorly developed legal systems so that 
contract enforcement is difficult. Finally, personal characteristics of migrants, such 
as their educational attainment, may affect the extent of their market knowledge and 
connections with local business networks. 
Similarly, if these arguments are correct, then migrants should be associated with 
greater investment flows between their country of residence and their country of 
birth, and this effect should be larger than for trade because of the larger 
informational requirements. Further, the effects of migrants should be larger 
between countries for which alternative networks are weaker or, perhaps, where 
migrants are better educated. 
These are the correlations that the analysis in subsequent chapters will seek to 
identify. Some of these have been explored within previous studies (table 1.1 and 
1.2). Most simply, many studies test whether migrants affect trade by their 
preferences for consuming goods from their country of birth by comparing 
elasticities of imports and exports to migrant numbers. Of the 9 previous studies 
comparing import and export flows, four studies find imports more responsive to 
migrant numbers, four studies find exports more responsive, while Helliwell (1997) 
reports different results depending upon whether the trade flows are international or 
intra-national. That is, there is no consistent evidence that migrants affect imports 
differently from exports. 
The literature has also explored whether migrant networks play a larger role in trade 
and investment flows where information barriers are larger, with mixed results. The 
literature provides some evidence that migrants play a larger role where trading 
partners do not share a common language (Dunlevy 2006) or colonial ties (Girma 
and Yu 2002). There is also some evidence that migrants have a larger effect on 
trade in ‘differentiated goods’ for which information is more valuable because 
quality may vary significantly between producers (Rauch and Trindade 1999, Gould 
1994, Bryant et al. 2004, Herander and Saavedra 2005). Finally, migrants may play 
a larger role in facilitating both trade and investment between countries with weaker 
institutions (Herander and Saavedra 2005, Dunlevy 2006, Tong 2006). 
2.2  Modelling trade flows 
To estimate accurately the roles played by migrants in facilitating trade it is 
necessary to control for other factors that determine trade flows. For this purpose, 
this paper employs the so-called ‘gravity trade model’. Empirically, this type of 
model has previously been found to explain much of the variation in bilateral trade 
flows.      




In its simplest form, the gravity model of international trade flows relates the 
magnitude of trade between economies to the product of their economic ‘masses’ 
and to the distance between them, in a similar way to Newton’s model of the force 
between two bodies due to gravity. That is, the value of imports is given by the 
following equation, where Mij is the total value of imports into country j from 
country i, Yi and Yj are the two countries’ respective gross domestic products and Tij 
captures the cost of moving goods from country i to country j, where originally Tij 
was assumed to be equal to the distance between the two countries. In practice, it is 
typical to also include other indicators of trade costs between countries, such as 
whether they share a common language or common border, and the current paper 
particularly focuses on the role that migrants play in affecting trade costs. The 
gravity model is normally estimated in logarithms.1 
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This simple version of the model is flawed because it omits two variables: the 
opportunities available for the exporting nation to trade elsewhere in the world and 
the price of goods available to import from other trading partners. Together these 
terms are often referred to as the ‘multilateral resistance’ to bilateral trade or simply 
the ‘remoteness’ of the exporter and importer. 
The pattern of trade between Australia and New Zealand provides an example of the 
importance of multilateral resistance. Trade flows between these two countries are 
very large. In 2000 almost US$ 6 billion in goods moved between the two countries, 
despite more than 2300 km separating Wellington from Canberra. For comparison, 
trade between Ireland and the Netherlands — a broadly similarly-sized pair of 
economies — totalled less than US$ 5 billion in the same year, despite only 760 km 
separating Dublin from Amsterdam. One difference is that whereas Australia and 
New Zealand are remote from other potential trading partners, Ireland and the 
Netherlands are able to trade at low cost with many European neighbours.  
Failing to take account of remoteness runs the risk that geography alone may 
produce a correlation between migration and trade. This may occur if 
                                              
1 Estimation in logarithms avoids the problem of strong heteroskedasticity when estimated in 
levels, with the variance in both trade flows and investment stocks roughly proportional to the 
square of the expected level of trade flow or investment stock. The downside is that this approach 
ignores many observations with zero trade and investment flows. Potentially, by discarding 
observations in a non-random fashion, this may result in biased estimates of the effects of 
migrants on trade or investment. An important effect of migrant networks may be to establish 
trade and investment relations where none would have otherwise existed, so the zero trade and 
investment flows are of interest. An earlier version of this paper used an approach that takes 
account of these zero observations and produced qualitatively similar results.     




geographically remote pairs of countries (such as Australia and New Zealand) also 
exchange more migrants than pairs of countries with many other neighbours (such 
as Ireland and the Netherlands). This paper uses different strategies to take account 
of remoteness in estimating the effects of migrants on bilateral and aggregate trade 
flows. 
Bilateral trade flows 
In estimating the effects of migrants on bilateral trade flows between their country 
of residence and country of birth, the analysis includes dummy variables for both 
trading partners. This ‘origin and destination fixed effects’ approach is fairly robust 
in that it avoids estimation bias that can arise because of any mis-specified or 
omitted factors associated with particular countries, including economic 
remoteness. It has been previously used, for example, by Wagner et al. (2002) and 
Dunlevy (2006). 
Though this approach solves problems associated with remoteness of trading 
partners, the regression equation may still be mis-specified. In practice, it is not 
feasible to include variables that capture the unique historical, cultural, political and 
business relationships between any pair of countries that may both affect trade and 
have affected historical migrant flows. Further, those variables that can be included, 
such as distance, provide only a rough proxy to the economic determinants of trade, 
such as transport costs, and these measurement errors may also bias results. To 
alleviate these problems, Pakko and Wall (2001) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2006) 
advocate panel estimation including ‘trading-pair fixed effects’ and Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2006) show that doing so halves the estimated elasticity of trade to migration 
compared to cross-sectional analysis.  
While data availability means that the current study cannot take a panel approach, 
an attempt is made to take account of this result. The current study includes, where 
possible, a number of important trading-pair-specific variables that may affect 
bilateral trade flows, including the size of expatriate communities and foreign 
investment stocks. The analysis also includes lagged trade flows in the regression 
equation, which may capture the effects of slow-moving, unmeasured, trading-pair-
specific factors.2 
                                              
2 The criticism of Bandyopadhyay et al. (2006) cautions against using the resulting regression 
coefficients to calculate long-run elasticities.     




Total trade flows 
The paper also seeks to investigate the effects of migration on a country’s total trade 
flows, or equivalently whether increasing the total number of migrants in a country 
from all countries of birth increase that country’s trade. This means focusing on the 
effects on trade of characteristics of trading partners, specifically aggregates of their 
immigrant and expatriate populations, so that the origin and destination fixed effects 
approach is no longer useful. Instead, the analysis includes variables that are likely 
correlated with each trading partner’s remoteness. While this method has been used 
frequently in the migration literature (for example, Dunlevy and Hutchinson 1999, 
Hutchinson and Dunlevy 2001, Girma and Yu 2002, Co et al. 2004), this paper is 
the first to use remoteness indicators with theoretical foundations.3 
The analysis makes use of a Taylor approximation to Anderson and van Wincoop’s 
(2003) ‘multilateral resistance’ terms, as suggested by Baier and Bergstrand 
(2006).4 The approximation starts by assuming world trade is completely free of 
transport costs and information barriers and then makes a linear correction to 
approximate the actual multilateral resistance to trade. This leads to estimation of 
each country’s multilateral resistance to trade with other world economies based on 
the GDP-weighted average of the indicator of trade barriers with all countries (such 
as distance, contiguity and migrant shares). For example, the multilateral form of 











ik k ij ij dist dist dist dist al multilater θ θ  












ik k dist dist dist θ θ θ θ  
The first term shows that if two countries are far apart compared to each country’s 
other potential trading partners, the variable will take a larger value. The second 
term shows that if two countries are far from other potential trading partners 
compared to the average distance between all countries in the world, then the 
variable will take a smaller value. Since it is presumed that these variables would 
take a negative coefficient in the trade equation, this implies that countries that are 
far apart trade less with each other, that countries that are more geographically 
                                              
3 This method is less robust than the origin and destination fixed effects approach and may produce 
biased results if the remoteness indicators do not do a good job of accounting for the important 
characteristics of the trading partners that affect both trade and migration. Wagner et al. (2002) 
show that in practice the two methods can produce significantly different results. 
4 Appendix B contains a discussion of Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) analysis and Baier and 
Bergstrand’s (2006) approximation methods.     




remote trade more with each other, and that the balance of these two effects can be 
explicitly calculated. 
Similar multilateral forms are constructed for other variables (contiguity, 
commonality of language, colonial ties). 
2.3  Modelling foreign investment stocks 
The analysis of bilateral foreign investment stocks is a straight-forward replication 
of the analysis for bilateral trade flows. The same gravity-model used to model 
trade flows has been widely and successfully applied to FDI and this is the approach 
that has been used in the majority of studies to date looking at the effects of 
migrants on foreign investment (Javorcik et al. 2006, Tong 2005, Buch et al. 2003).  
As for the modelling of bilateral trade flows, origin and destination fixed effects are 
included thereby avoiding the need for strong theoretical underpinnings. Lagged 
investment stocks are also included in the regression as a broad indicator of historic 
ties between countries, informed by problems overcome in estimating the trade 
equation. 
However, the paper also seeks to explore the effects of migrants on total investment 
stocks. At this point in the analysis of trade flows, the theory underpinning the 
gravity model was employed to identify which additional variables should be 
included in the model. However, there is no similar empirically estimable theory of 
investment.5 The approach taken is to relax minimally the restrictions on the gravity 
equation by replacing the dummy variables for the migrant’s country of residence 
with a few simple indicators: GDP, GDP per capita and an indicator of economic 
remoteness (the GDP-weighted distance to other countries, as used for the analysis 
of trade flows). In this approach, dummy variables for the migrants’ countries of 
birth are retained. 
The quality of legal and bureaucratic institutions and the investor’s familiarity with 
the legal environment of the host country are also likely important determinants of 
investment decisions. Poor legal protection of assets raises the risk of expropriation 
and poorly functioning markets increase the cost of doing business (Wei 2000, 
Habib and Zurawicki 2002). Investors may be less uncertain when investing in 
countries with similar legal systems. The analysis includes an indicator of 
corruption in the host country and an indicator of whether the legal systems of two 
countries share British, French, German, Scandinavian or socialist origins. 
                                              
5 Preliminary investigation found that the knowledge-capital model of foreign direct investment 
did not fit this dataset well.     




2.4  Main data sources 
A bilateral trade, investment and migration cross-section was constructed for 
28  OECD countries and up to 162 partner countries (totalling 4508 possible 
observations) in or around the year 2000. 
The OECD Database of Immigrants and Expatriates provided data on the number 
of migrants in each OECD country (except Iceland). Data were generally obtained 
from the census closest to 2000 undertaken in each country and separately identify 
migrants by country of birth. Working-age migrants (those aged 15 years or over) 
were also identified by whether they have low (not completed secondary school), 
medium (completed secondary school) or high (tertiary) educational attainment. 
The data collection was close to complete, with more than 99 per cent  of  the 
counted population in OECD countries reporting a country of birth and more than 
98 per cent of the working-age population reporting education level. 
Bilateral merchandise trade flows were sourced from the NBER-UN Trade 
Database as described in Feenstra et al. (2005). While the original database 
reported trade to or from 72 countries, which account for around 98 per cent of 
world exports, the analysis focuses on trade to or from 28 OECD countries, which 
account for around 73 per cent of world exports. Foreign direct investment stocks 
were obtained from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 
1992-2003. The 28 OECD countries studied hosted 71 per cent of global inward 
FDI and were the source of 87 per cent of global outward FDI in 2000 (UNCTAD 
2006). 
Full definitions and sources of other data are provided in appendix C. At each stage 
data sources were chosen and data manipulated to optimise the available coverage 
of countries.     
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3 Trade 
The two sections of this chapter look at different effects from migration. The first 
section considers the effect on bilateral trade of an increase in the number of 
migrants in a particular country of residence from a particular country of birth. The 
empirical results reproduce the robust positive correlation between bilateral patterns 
of trade and migrant numbers found in the previous literature. The second section 
considers the effect on aggregate trade of an increase in the aggregate number of 
migrants in a particular country of residence. Though this effect is much more 
difficult to quantify, the results suggest that the increase in bilateral trade associated 
with migration arises largely at the expense of trade with other countries. 
3.1  Effects on bilateral trade flows 
This section presents estimates of the effects of migrant numbers on imports and 
exports between their country of residence and country of birth. The analysis is then 
extended in an attempt to understand the role played by migrants in providing 
information regarding profitable trading opportunities. 
Some methodological details 
Before discussing results a few methodological comments are warranted. As a result 
of using origin and destination fixed effects, the effect on trade flows of variables 
that are identified with particular countries, such as GDP and population, cannot be 
estimated. The variables included are the great-circle distance between countries 
(distance), whether the two countries share a land border (contiguity), speak a 
common language (language), or have an historical colonial tie (colony), the stock 
of foreign investment held between the two countries (FDI in and FDI out), and the 
average tariff rate levied by the importer on merchandise from the exporter (tariff). 
Appendix C contains a summary of the variable names used in the tables. 
The main explanatory variable of interest is the logarithm of the number of migrants 
born in the trading partner as a share of the local population (for example, 
importer’s share is the number of migrants as a share of the importer’s population).     




This form of the model was chosen in part because it was statistically preferred,1 
and in part because it fits more closely with the underlying theory.2 However, a 
problem with this approach is that some countries report no migrants from a 
particular country and so the logarithm of the migrant share is not always defined. 
In this case, the share of migrants in the population is taken to be 1 per 1 million 
population, and an additional dummy variable called share0 takes the value 1.3 The 
coefficient on share0 can be interpreted as the effect on trade of decreasing the 
migrant population from 1  person per million to zero. This coefficient would 
ordinarily be expected to be small, but may be affected by idiosyncrasies related to 
data collection (since many of the zero observations occur within three countries: 
Korea, Germany and Austria). 
Initial results 
The normal practice in previous studies has been to estimate separately the effects 
that migrants have on imports and exports. Analysed in this way, results from the 
larger sample of trade between 28 OECD countries and 162 trading partners 
(table 3.1, columns I and II) suggest an elasticity of bilateral imports to migrant 
numbers of around 0.15 and an elasticity of bilateral exports to migrant numbers of 
around 0.18. Analysis of the smaller sample of trade within the 28 OECD countries 
produces similar estimates (columns III and IV). 
                                              
1 Statistically preferred in that, after controlling for the logarithm of the migrant share of the total 
population, other potential migrant indicators were individually not significant (including the log 
of the number of migrants, the migrant share of the population, and the log of the migrant share 
of the working-age population). 
2 First, the logarithmic form of the relationship assumes a constant elasticity of trade to migrant 
numbers and hence diminishing returns to additional migrants. This is consistent with the 
information-based explanation for the relationship between migration and trade, in that each 
additional migrant from a particular country contributes less additional information on trading 
opportunities because local firms are better informed when they arrive. Second, including 
migrants as a share of the population rather than as a total number is consistent with the idea that 
these information benefits are quite localised. In this form of the model migrants into Australia 
would have the same effect if considered as a single nation or divided into its States and 
Territories (so long as the migrants were distributed in proportion to the state populations).  
3 A similar approach has previously been taken by Wagner et al. (2002) and Bryant et al. (2004).     
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Table 3.1  Bilateral trade and migrants: effects of language, distance, 
foreign investment and colonial tiesa 
Dependent variable is log imports or log exports 
  Large sample  Imports, OECD sample 
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n 3814  4085  755  755  755  755  629 
Country of 
residence FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of birth 
FE  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2 0.933  0.956  0.994  0.923 0.994  0.994 0.994 
Standard error  1.234  0.969  0.580 0.576 0.574 0.553  0.559 
a Standard errors calculated using the White-robust estimator are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels. Results in column VII relate to working-age 
migrants as a share of the working-age population.     




A problem with these estimates of the effects of migrant populations is that they 
ignore the effects of expatriate populations. It is likely that the size of expatriate 
populations is generally correlated with the size of migrant populations. Strong 
cultural similarities between countries may encourage two-way flows of migrants. 
These may be reinforced through bilateral agreements to provide work permits to 
each other’s citizens, such as currently applies between Australia and New Zealand 
or within European Union countries. Finally, migrant populations themselves may 
encourage reverse flows of migration if they return to their country of birth with 
foreign-born spouses or children. In practice, the number of migrants and 
expatriates is strongly correlated, at least across the OECD (figure 3.1). Omitting 
the effects of expatriate populations may bias these estimates of the effects of 
migrant populations. 
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Data source: As discussed in section 2.4. A line of best fit is shown; its slope is statistically different from zero 
at conventional significance levels. 
It is possible to take account of both migrant populations and expatriate populations 
within the smaller sample of trade between OECD countries. Column V of table 3.1 
shows the estimated effects on imports of immigrants living in the importing 
country and expatriates living abroad. The analysis imposes the restriction that 
migrants and expatriates have the same effect on imports (or equivalently, that 
migrants have the same effect on imports and exports) because the strong 
correlation between these variables makes it difficult to estimate their effects 
separately. The results suggest an elasticity of imports or exports to migrants of 
around 0.09, which is only a little more than one-half the elasticities to migrant 
populations that were estimated without controlling for expatriate populations.     
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Bandyopadhay et al. (2006) found a similar reduction in the estimated elasticity of 
trade to migrant populations when they add trading-pair dummy variables, and this 
result suggests a possible explanation for their result. While the estimated elasticity 
of trade to migrants is somewhat smaller than those in most previous studies, 
migrants have still have quite important effects on the direction of trade (box 3.1).  
The other variables in the equation are generally found to take their expected sign 
and magnitude. Countries that are far apart trade much less than countries that are 
close together. The estimated elasticity of trade to distance is between -0.7 and -0.9, 
which is close to the average found across the gravity-trade literature and, as 
discussed above, such a large elasticity should be interpreted as evidence of 
information barriers between countries. Countries that share a common language or 
that have colonial ties appear to trade somewhat more than countries that do not in 
at least some specifications of the model. Tariffs reduce the flow of trade between 
countries. 
The role of information barriers 
The initial results show that migrants act to increase bilateral trade, but provide little 
understanding of how migrants have this effect. Chapter 2 argued that migrants 
likely affect trade flows by providing information about business opportunities. If 
this were true, their effect should be largest where the information barriers between 
countries are largest. To test these relationships, the share of migrants was 
interacted with a range of other variables that proxy for information barriers: 
distance; foreign investment (lagged a decade to avoid simultaneity bias); colonial 
ties; and commonality of language. 
There is some evidence that migrants help to overcome information barriers 
(table 3.1, column VI). Migrants appear to have a larger effect on trade between 
countries separated by greater distances, a smaller effect where countries do not also 
exchange foreign investment,4 and a smaller effect where countries share a common 
language. Roughly, doubling the distance between two countries increases the 
elasticity of trade to migrants by 0.026, doubling the level of foreign direct 
investment between the two countries reduces the elasticity of trade to migrants by 
0.003, while the elasticity of trade to migrants is smaller by 0.039 if two countries 
                                              
4 The finding that trade and capital tend to flow together is common in the empirical literature 
(Collins et al. 1997, Head and Ries 2001, Hejazi and Safarian 2001), against predictions of 
standard trade models based on differences in resource endowments (Mundell 1957). A possible 
explanation is that intra-firm trade is increasingly important. For example, around half of US 
international trade is intra-firm (Blonigen 2005).     




share a common language. Surprisingly, there is some evidence that migrants have a 
larger effect on trade between countries that share colonial ties.  
One implication is that migrants may have a stronger influence on Australian trade 
ties because of Australia’s remoteness. Figure 3.2 illustrates the effects that 
distance, foreign investment, common language and colonial ties have on the 
estimated elasticities of trade to the number of migrants living in Australia. On 
average Australia is 15,000 km from other OECD countries, almost three times the 
average distance between all OECD countries. As a result, the estimated elasticity 
of Australia’s bilateral trade to migrants is as high as 0.16 with many OECD 
countries. Only for trade with New Zealand is the elasticity of trade to migrant 
numbers below average, because of its proximity, English-speaking population and 
the strong foreign investment ties between the two countries. 
Figure 3.2  Contributions to the estimated elasticities of Australian trade to 
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The role of education 
Many characteristics of migrants may be important in determining the effect they 
have on trade flows. From a policy perspective, the most interesting is the skill level 
of migrants since this has been a target of migration policy in a number of countries. 
In Australia, qualification for particular occupations and work experience play a 
role in selection of migrants. Given data limitations, the current analysis looks only 
at broad attainment of formal education in promoting trade.     
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The potential effect of migrant skills on trade is ambiguous. On the one hand, more 
educated and skilled migrants may bring with them more market information and 
may enter more influential positions within their countries of residence. On the 
other hand, more educated migrants may be better positioned to pioneer 
trade-replacing industries within their host countries and may also be less likely to 
work directly in importing and exporting businesses. Previous studies have found 
mixed results, with some evidence that more skilled migrants have a larger effect on 
trade (Head and Ries 1998, Herander and Saavedra 2005), some evidence that they 
have a smaller effect on trade (Gould 1994) and some evidence that this is different 
for exports and imports (Mundra 2005). 
The current analysis suggests that migrants have a larger effect on trade the more 
education they have (table 3.1, column VII). The estimates suggest that a 
10 percentage point increase in the proportion of migrants with tertiary education, in 
place of migrants that lack secondary education, increases the volume of trade 
between countries by 7  per  cent (over and above the normal effect of migrant 
numbers). 
Trade by type of good 
If migrants affect trade through their knowledge and business networks, the effect 
should be larger for commodities that are differentiated, in the sense that their 
quality varies significantly between suppliers. For these goods, the buyer has some 
inherent uncertainty regarding the quality and characteristics of the product 
purchased from any particular manufacturer and the price alone does not convey all 
of the information relevant for international trade. 
Following Rauch (1999), differentiated goods are identified based on whether it is 
possible to quote ‘reference prices’ for the goods, that is prices that do not specify 
the supplier. Commodities that do not have reference prices are called 
‘differentiated goods’. The remainder, homogeneous goods, are further split based 
upon whether reference prices are quoted on organised exchanges (‘exchange-
quoted homogeneous goods’) or quoted only in trade publications (‘publication-
quoted homogeneous goods’). For the former homogeneous goods it is assumed 
there are many well-informed, specialised traders so that there is likely little 
opportunity for migrant networks to improve information flows. 
The results show that migrants are associated with greater bilateral trade in all types 
of goods (figure 3.3). Consistent with expectations, the results suggest that trade in 
differentiated goods may be more strongly affected by migrants than trade in 
homogenous goods, but the elasticities are not precisely estimated and the 
difference in these estimates may be due to chance. Overall, these results are     




consistent with the idea that migrants affect trade through their knowledge and 
business networks, but are not conclusive in their own right. 
As a cross-check on these results, two alternative ways of disaggregating 
merchandise trade were considered. Previous studies have found that the effects of 
migrants are smaller for crude or primary products (Bryant, Genç and Law 2004, 
Dunlevy and Hutchinson 2001) and larger for consumer goods (Gould 1994, 
Herander and Saavedra 2005). The results suggest that migrants affect trade in 
consumer goods more strongly than trade in other goods, but there is no statistical 
difference between the estimated elasticity of trade in primary or non-primary goods 
to the migrant share of the populations.5 
Finally, migrants may be expected to have a larger effect on trade in services to the 
extent that they are more closely tailored to the needs of individual clients than are 
many mass-produced goods. The results suggest that migrants affect trade in 
services more strongly than for most other goods.  



























a Estimated elasticities of bilateral trade to migrant shares of the population based on regression 
specifications as in column V of table 3.1, except that the ‘services trade’ regression uses lagged merchandise 
trade flows in place of the lagged dependent variable. Error bars indicate 95 per cent confidence intervals. The 
labels ‘N/consumer goods’ and ‘N/primary products’ refer to all goods excluding consumer goods and primary 
products respectively. 
                                              
5 Primary products are defined to include: food and live animals chiefly for food; crude materials 
(inedible) except fuel; mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials; and animal and vegetable 
oils, fats and waxes (SITC rev.2 classes 0, 2, 3 and 4). Consumer goods are defined to include: 
food and live animals chiefly for food; beverages and tobacco; leather products; furniture; travel 
goods and handbags; clothing and apparel; and footwear (SITC rev.2 classes 0, 1, 61, 82, 83, 84 
and 85).     
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Box 3.1  The changing direction of Australian trade 
The origins of Australian migrants and the directions of Australian trade have been 
changing (appendix A). Over the three decades to 2001, the numbers of Australians 
born in China increased from 17,000 to 143,000, those born in Korea increased from 
379 to around 39,000 and those born in Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos increased from 
666 to around 187,000. During the same period, the number of Australians born in the 
United Kingdom or Ireland was steady, while the number born in Greece or Italy fell by 
around one-quarter. On the surface, these changes in migrant origins parallel the 
changes in the direction of Australian trade over the same period. The proportions of 
Australian trade with the UK and Ireland and Southern Europe have fallen, while the 
proportions of trade with East Asia and South-East Asia have increased. 
The results in this section allow an exploration of the possible connection between 
these trends. The regression results suggested that a 1  per  cent increase in the 
number of migrants may increase bilateral trade by around 0.09  per  cent (see 
table 3.1, column V). Applying this result to the changes in the number of migrants 
living in Australia (using a smearing estimate as in Duan (1983)) provides some 
illustrative estimates of the effects that migrants might have had on the direction of 
Australian trade. 
A good deal of caution is warranted, though. The estimated marginal effects were 
obtained from comparisons of OECD-country trade at a point in time and may not 
accurately reflect the effects that migrants have on Australian trade over time. 
Moreover, some of the changes in migrant numbers over the past three decades have 
been large, so that applying the estimates of the marginal effect of migrants on trade 
will not produce accurate predictions. 
Table 3.2 Changing  directions  of  Australian merchandise tradea 
  Proportion of Australian trade 
 1970  2000  Change 
 Change  attributable 
to migrants? 
  %  %  % pt    % pt 
East Asia  27 36  9    3 
South-East Asia  5 14  9    1 
New Zealand  4 5  1    0 
Southern Europe  4 3  0    -1 
North America  23 18  -5    -1 
UK and Ireland  18 6  -12    -1 
Other  20 18  -2    -1 
a These simulations are based on 63 countries and country groups for which data on migrant populations 
and trade are available in both time periods and are not necessarily the best estimates of trade by region 
in either year. Migrant populations are sourced from the 1971 and 2001 censuses. 
(continued on next page) 
 
     




Box 3.1  (continued) 
With these limitations in mind, table 3.2 illustrates the regional distribution of Australia’s 
trade in 2000 that may have resulted had Australia maintained its 1970 migrant 
populations. Changes in Australia’s migrant populations appear to have played a role 
in the changing directions of Australian trade. Perhaps as much as 3 percentage points 
of the 9 percentage point increase in the proportion of Australian trade with East Asia 
and around 1 percentage point of the 9 percentage point increase in the proportion of 
Australian trade with South-East Asia may be due to the relative strengthening of 
migrant links with those regions. Nevertheless, this suggests that most of the change in 
Australia’s directions of trade has occurred for other reasons, which presumably 
include the growth in the relative economic importance and openness of many Asian 
countries and the effect on UK and Irish trade of closer ties within the European Union. 
 
 
3.2  Effects on aggregate trade flows 
The analysis to this point provides support for the idea that migrant networks 
increase bilateral imports and exports between their country of residence and 
country of birth. If so, a possible side-effect is that these migrant networks between 
some country pairs will draw trade from country pairs without migrant networks. A 
natural question is whether migrants increase total international trade or simply 
change the pattern of trading partners. 
The paper takes three approaches to attempt to answer this question. The first 
approach is to study the effect that the total number of migrants from all countries 
of birth has on the bilateral trade flows of their country of residence. The second 
approach is to investigate the effects of aggregate migrant numbers on openness to 
international trade. Finally, the implications of the theory underpinning the 
gravity-trade equation are explored. 
Do countries with more migrants trade more? 
A first attempt to estimate the effects of migration on the total volume of trade is to 
supplement the analysis in the previous section by estimating the effect that the total 
migrant share of the population (total share) from all countries of birth, has on the 
international trade of the country of residence. If migrants affected only the pattern 
of trading partners, and not the total volume of trade, the elasticity of trade to the 
total migrant share of the population would precisely offset the direct effects of 
migrants born in that partner country. A 1  per  cent increase in the number of 
migrants from all countries of birth would then have no effect on trade. 
The analysis is undertaken without origin and destination fixed effects, but by 
including the GDP-weighted multilateral form of each bilateral variable (distance,     
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contiguity, colony and language) discussed in chapter 2. Four variables are added: 
the product of the two countries’ GDPs (mass); the product of the two countries’ 
GDP per capita (masspc); and variables counting the countries in the pair that are 
landlocked (landlocked) or an island (island). A random effects estimation approach 
is taken to control for within-group correlation of error terms that would otherwise 
tend to bias downwards the estimated standard errors on the total share variables 
(Moulton 1986). 
The results (table 3.3, columns I, II and III) suggest that migrants have a much 
larger effect on the directions of trade than on total trade volumes. As in the 
previous section, migrants are found to increase bilateral trade between their 
country of residence and country of birth. However, after controlling for the 
positive effect that migrants have on bilateral trade with their country of birth, 
countries that contain more migrants in total appear to trade less. The coefficients 
on the total share variables are not statistically different in magnitude to those on 
the bilateral migrant share variables. This suggests that if the number of migrants 
from all countries of birth increased proportionately, the effect on the total trade 
volumes of their country of birth would be small. 
Does migration affect openness? 
The analysis of bilateral trade patterns in the previous subsection suggested that, on 
balance, increasing the total number of migrants in a country from all other 
countries has only a small effect on the total volume of trade. To supplement that 
analysis, this subsection explores the relationship between migrants and aggregate 
openness to trade. 
Analysis of aggregate openness (taken here to be the ratio of merchandise imports 
plus merchandise exports to GDP) has advantages and disadvantages compared to 
analysis of bilateral trade flows. The main advantage is that aggregate data are 
available for many more countries and years. The disadvantage is that there is little 
theory to guide the empirical modelling of aggregate openness.     




Table 3.3  Bilateral trade flows and the total number of migrantsa 
Regression results; dependent variable is imports or exports measured in million 
US dollars 
 Full  sample    OECD  sample 
 Imports  Exports    Imports 
 I  II    III 




















































































n 3814  4085    755 
Country of residence RE  Yes  Yes    Yes 
Country of birth RE        Yes 
R
2 0.721  0.807    0.837 
Standard error  1.484  1.122    0.578 
a Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 per cent levels.     
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Guttman and Richards (2004) considered some factors that may affect openness and 
the analysis here builds on their results. First, the size of a country in terms of land 
area may matter because large countries tend to have more diverse resource bases, 
encouraging greater self-sufficiency. Second, the size of a country in terms of 
population may matter because, with economies of scale and lower intra-national 
than international transport costs, larger countries will tend to manufacture more to 
serve their own consumers. Third, remoteness from world economic activity raises 
the cost of international trade relative to intra-national trade, and so lowers 
openness. Finally, trade policy plays a role. The current study includes an index of 
tariffs (with a higher score indicating lower tariffs). 
Cross-sections were considered at five-year intervals between 1960 and 2005 
covering between 86 and 126 countries. The following equation is estimated in each 
year with ordinary least squares. The variable of most interest is the total migrant 
share in the population (total share). 
ln(opennessi)= β0 + β1ln(total sharei) + β2ln(populationi)+ β3ln(land areai)+ 
   β4ln(remotenessi)+β5tariff indexi+ εi 
The results suggest that in recent years countries that have a larger share of migrants 
in their populations do not have noticeably higher openness to trade. In 2000, 
countries with a 1 per cent larger share of migrants in their populations tended to be 
0.03  per  cent more open to trade, but this effect was not statistically significant 
(decennial results are presented in table 3.4).6 This is consistent with the analysis 
based on bilateral trade patterns.  
However, there is some evidence that in past decades this may not have been the 
case. In 1960, for example, countries with a 1 per cent larger share of migrants in 
the population were 0.12 per cent more open to trade and this effect was statistically 
significant (figure 3.4). Interestingly, the magnitude of this historical elasticity of 
openness to the migrant share of the population is similar to the simple elasticities 
of bilateral imports and exports to migrants discussed at the start of this chapter 
(table 3.1, column V). A better understanding of the historical role of migrants in 
international trade would require historical data on bilateral migrant numbers. 
                                              
6 The estimated effects of other variables differ from those of Guttman and Richards (2004) in two 
ways. First, in the current analysis the remoteness measure generally does not play a significant 
role in determining openness. Second, the role of population is smaller than in Guttman and 
Richards (2004), but this is compensated by land area playing a larger role. Both of these 
differences appear to be mainly due to the use of openness measured by merchandise trade as a 
share of GDP from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, rather than openness from 
the Penn World Tables.     




Table 3.4 Opennessa 
Dependent variable is the log of merchandise imports plus exports divided by GDP 
  1960 1970 1980 1990  2000


















































n  86  97 106 111 126 
R
2  0.5012 0.7086 0.5600 0.4261 0.2887 
a Standard errors calculated using the White-robust estimator are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels. 
Figure 3.4 Estimated  elasticity  of  openness  to the total migrant share of 



















Data source: Author’s calculations. Dashed lines show 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
Should countries with more migrants be expected to trade more? 
The analysis to this point has described the relationship between migrants and trade 
in the data set. However, if the theory underpinning the gravity trade model is 
interpreted literally then it is possible to calculate the extent to which the increase in 
bilateral trade between migrants’ country of residence and country of birth should     
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be expected to accompany a reduction in trade between other countries. Appendix B 
contains the detailed analysis and only the results are summarised here. 
The theory is applied to two scenarios. The first scenario considers what happens to 
a country if it were to increase the migrant share of its population. The total migrant 
share of the population can easily be affected by policy choices, such as the 
Australian Minister for Immigration’s choice of the number of permanent visas to 
be made available each year. To represent this choice, the scenario modelled here 
assumes a simple 10 per cent increase in the number of migrants from all countries 
of birth resident in a single country. Of course, in practice the effects on trade will 
be more complex because the source countries from which migrants arrive are 
affected by the criteria used to choose between applicants (such as the relative size 
of the skill, family reunion and humanitarian programs). 
With an elasticity of trade to migrant numbers of around 0.1, the effect of increasing 
by 10 per cent the number of migrants living in Australia from a particular country 
of birth tends to increase bilateral trade by around 1 per cent. However, if Australia 
were to increase the number of migrants from all countries then the effect on 
Australia’s aggregate trade would be smaller at around 0.8 per cent (figure 3.5). 
Figure 3.5  Estimated effects of increasing the number of migrants on the 















Scenario 1 Scenario 2
 
Data source: See appendix B.     




The second scenario models the effects from the ongoing trend towards the 
circulation of people across the borders of developed countries. It involves 
increasing by 10 per cent the number of migrants living in all countries from all 
countries of birth. Again, with an elasticity of bilateral trade to migrants of 0.1 the 
effect on bilateral trade of increasing migrant and expatriate populations by 
10 per cent would be around 2 per cent. But when all migrant populations increase 
the effect on aggregate trade is only around 1.4 per cent. 
Though only approximate, these scenarios show that a significant portion of the 
increase in bilateral trade when Australia’s migrant population increases is due to 
‘diversion’ of trade from other countries. Migrants living in other countries such as 
Canada, which trade more heavily with nearby neighbours, appear to reduce trade 
with other countries to an even greater extent (see appendix B). In an average 
OECD country, roughly half of the bilateral increase in trade when the number of 
migrants increases is due to a reduction in trade with other countries. 
     




4 Foreign  direct  investment 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that migrants have a very different 
effect on investment than on trade. Migrants appear to increase bilateral investment 
between their country of residence and country of birth and this effect is stronger 
than for trade. However, it is difficult to determine the manner in which migrants 
affect investment. It is not clear whether migrants have a larger effect on investment 
where information barriers between countries appear to be larger. Finally, unlike the 
study of trade in the previous chapter, there is not evidence that the increase in 
bilateral investment results in a reduction in investment with other countries. 
4.1  Effects on bilateral investment 
This section begins by analysing the effect of migrants on inward and outward 
investment stocks and is extended by considering the roles of other information 
barriers and the role played by the education levels of migrants. 
More methodological details 
The analysis uses the standard gravity-type variables (distance,  contiguity, 
language, colony, tariff, legal origin). Since FDI figures were taken for the year 
closest to 2000 for which data were available (up to 3 years either side), dummy 
variables for each year were also included. To these was added a variable 
(improvement in remoteness) calculated by summing the reduction in the minimum 
distance to world markets from two plants (that is, in the source country and in the 
host country) compared to a single plant in the source country.1 This is intended to 
capture a motivation for not just horizontal investment, but also export-platform 
investment. (Intel’s investment in Ireland to supply the large and nearby consumer 
markets of continental Europe is one example.) Since this measure varies by 
country-pair it can be included in the regression together with country fixed effects, 
where the normal indicator of motivations for horizontal investment (host country 
GDP) could not. 
                                              
1 The variable is constructed by adding up, weighted by the GDP in each potential consumer 
market, the difference in distance from the source country and the host country to each consumer 
market wherever the host is closer than the source to a consumer market.     





Migrants appear to increase significantly the amount of investment between their 
country of residence and country of birth. Analysis that looks only at the effects of 
migrants on investment without controlling for the effects of expatriate populations 
suggests an elasticity of between 0.23 and 0.29 (table 4.1, columns III-IV), broadly 
in line with the results of previous studies (table 1.2).  
However, these estimates appear to be biased because the effects of expatriate 
populations are ignored in much the same way as the estimates for trade flows in the 
previous chapter. Taking account of the role played by expatriate populations, 
suggests a better estimate of the elasticity of bilateral investment to migrant 
numbers is around 0.15 (table 4.1, column V). 
Other variables generally had their expected effect on investment. Investment falls 
away sharply as the distance between countries increases. An elasticity to foreign 
investment of around -0.64 among OECD countries (column V) means that the 
volume of investment falls by around 40  per  cent as the distance between two 
countries doubles. For investment out of OECD countries the estimated elasticity is 
much larger, around -1.45 (column II), indicating that the volume of investment 
falls by around 60 per cent as the distance between two countries doubles. This 
difference is consistent with the idea that distance is a proxy for information 
barriers, since the alternative information sources are probably scarcer regarding 
investment opportunities in, and characteristics of, less developed countries. In most 
models, countries appear to invest more with countries that share a common 
language, and there is some evidence (column II) that OECD countries invest more 
in countries with which they have colonial ties. 
The role of other information barriers 
The most plausible explanation for the relationship between migrants and 
investment is that migrants help to overcome information barriers between 
countries. The strongest support for this conjecture is that the estimated elasticity of 
investment to migrants is much larger than the elasticity of trade to migrants found 
in the previous chapter. This is in line with expectations, given the greater amount 
of information required by prospective investors compared to traders.     




If migrants help to overcome information barriers to investment then their effect 
should be largest where the information barriers between countries are largest. To 
test these relationships, the share of migrants was interacted with other variables 
that proxy for information barriers: distance; colonial ties; and commonality of 
language. However, there was no evidence that migrants have a different effect on 
investment between countries separated by larger information barriers (table 4.1, 
column VI). 
The role of education 
More educated migrants may be expected to have a larger effect on foreign 
investment because they are better positioned financially and socially to help 
entrepreneurs invest abroad. To date, only Javorcik et al. (2006) have investigated 
this relationship, finding some evidence that that the effect of migrants is larger 
where migrants held tertiary qualifications. The current results support this finding 
(table  4.1, column VII). Roughly, a 1  percentage point increase in the share of 
migrants with tertiary qualifications, at the expense of migrants without complete 
secondary education, appears to raise investment by 3 per cent. An increase in the 
share of migrants with complete secondary education, at the expense of migrants 
without complete secondary education, appears to raise investment to a lesser 
extent. 
     




Table 4.1  Bilateral investment and migrants: effects of distance, language 
and colonial ties 
Dependent variable is inward or outward direct investment stock, measured in 
million US dollars 
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n 1108 1494    574  574  574  574  480 
Host country FE  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source country FE  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Reporting year FE  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2 0.853 0.814    0.974  0.973 0.973  0.974  0.977 
Standard error  1.281  1.260    1.129 1.143 1.132 1.134  1.080 
a Standard errors calculated using the White-robust estimator are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels. Results in column VII relate to working-age 
migrants as a share of the working-age population.     




4.2  Effects on aggregate investment 
Migrants appear to increase bilateral investment between their country of residence 
and country of birth. In chapter 1, it was argued that in some cases, particularly 
where the investment is ‘vertical’, this additional investment may come at the 
expense of investment into third countries. That is, the effect of increasing the 
number of migrants from all countries of birth may be different than the effects of 
increasing the number of migrants from a particular country.  
To investigate this possibility, the analysis within the previous section was extended 
by estimating the effect that the total migrant share of the population (total share) 
from all countries of birth has on the international investment of the country of 
residence. In the absence of any theory as a guide, the approach taken is to relax 
minimally the restrictions on the gravity model. Dummy variables are still included 
to control for unobserved characteristics of the migrants’ country of birth. However, 
dummy variables are not included for the migrants’ country of residence and three 
other variables are added to control for some of the most important characteristics 
of each country: GDP; GDP per capita; and a measure of remoteness (host 
remoteness or source remoteness), which is the GDP-weighted distance to the rest 
of the world as constructed in the previous chapter. The analysis also includes a 
corruption index based on data published by Transparency International, with a 
higher score indicating lower perceptions of corruption. 
The results do not provide strong evidence that the increase in bilateral investment 
attributable to migrants accompanies a reduction in investment into other countries. 
Patterns of investment between OECD countries and all other countries in the world 
(table 4.2, columns I and II) suggest that as much as half of the effect of migrants on 
bilateral investment may be offset by a reduction in investment with other countries, 
but the estimated reduction is not statistically different from zero.     




Table 4.2  Bilateral investment and the total number of migrants 
Dependent variable is inward or outward direct investment stock, measured in 
million US dollars 
 Large  sample    OECD  sample 
 Inward  Outward    Inward 
 I  II    III 










































































































n 1108 1494    574 
Host country FE    Yes     
Source country FE  Yes       
Host country RE  Yes      Yes 
Source country RE    Yes    Yes 
Reporting year FE  Yes  Yes    Yes 
R
2 0.830 0.789    0.774 
Standard error  1.284  1.261    1.097 
a Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 per cent levels.     
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5 Conclusions 
This paper’s main conclusion is that the consequences of immigration and 
emigration for productivity and living standards through their effects on 
international business and social networks are more nuanced than they previously 
appeared. 
Previous studies have shown that countries trade more with partner countries from 
which they have received more migrants. The current results confirm this bilateral 
correlation. Bilateral trading patterns suggest that migrants increase trade between 
their country of residence and country of birth, with a 10 per cent increase in the 
number of migrants from a particular country of birth estimated to raise bilateral 
trade with that country by 0.9 per cent (table 3.1). 
However, countries with larger numbers of migrants do not tend to be much more 
open to trade. For example, aggregate trade data suggest that a country that 
increased its migrant population by 10 per cent would only see its aggregate trade 
increase by 0.3  per  cent (and this effect is not statistically different from zero, 
table 3.4). This suggests that migrants have a larger effect on the direction of trade 
than on total volumes. 
These results do not imply that migrants play insignificant roles in building business 
ties between countries and in reducing the costs of trade to Australian businesses. It 
is precisely because migrants appear to lower trade costs between their country of 
residence and country of birth that they appear to change the direction of trade. 
Rather, the results imply that simply increasing the number of migrants from all 
countries of birth, by say 10 per cent, should be expected to have a much smaller 
effect on aggregate trade than may have naïvely been expected given previous 
studies of the effects of migrants on bilateral trade with their country of birth. This 
suggests caution in applying the results from other papers that have demonstrated 
the beneficial effects that increasing aggregate international trade can have on a 
country’s productivity and living standards. 
The effects of migrants on foreign direct investment appear to be different. Bilateral 
investment patterns show that migrants increase investment between their country 
of residence and country of birth, with a 10  per  cent increase in the number of 
migrants from a particular country of birth estimated to raise bilateral investment 
with that country by 1.7 per cent (table 4.1). There was no strong evidence that this     




increase in bilateral investment accompanies a reduction of the stock of investment 
in other countries. 
The paper also explores the roles that migrant networks play in overcoming 
information barriers between countries. The results show that migrants help to 
overcome information barriers to trade. Migrants appear to have a smaller effect on 
trade where countries share a common language or where there are strong business 
networks already in place (indicated by the historical stock of FDI) and that 
migrants have a larger effect on trade between countries that are further apart. 
However, there was no evidence that migrants help to overcome information 
barriers to foreign investment. These results support the approach taken to model 
trade flows, but raise some doubt as to whether the approach used to model foreign 
investment is sound. Taken together with the lack of theoretical underpinning for 
the gravity model of investment employed and lesser accuracy and completeness of 
the foreign investment data, this suggests that the results for trade flows should be 
interpreted as somewhat more reliable than those from the analysis of foreign 
investment stocks.     





A  Australia's patterns of migration, 
trade and foreign investment 
This appendix outlines changing volumes of Australia’s trade, migration and 
foreign investment flows over time, how these compare with other OECD countries 
and the patterns of bilateral relationships. Over the past half-century both the 
proportion of migrants in the Australian population and the proportion of trade in 
the Australian economy have been rising, and the directions of both migration and 
trade have been shifting away from the United Kingdom and Ireland and towards 
Asia. 
A.1 Migration   
Migrants have always played a large role in the Australian economy. At Federation 
in 1901 around 23 per cent of the population was foreign born (figure A.1). This 
proportion declined steadily through to the end of the Second World War, at which 
point less than 10  per  cent of the population was foreign born. Since that time, 
successive waves of migration from Europe and, later, Asia have returned the 
proportion of the population that was foreign born to around 23 per cent in 2001 (or 
more than 4  million people), while increasing the cultural diversity of the 
population. 
Elsewhere in the OECD, migrants generally play a smaller role than in Australian 
society (figure  A.2). Migrant populations remain large in historical ‘settler’ 
economies — New Zealand, Canada and the United States — and in some small, 
open European economies such as Switzerland. In most European countries 
migrants represent a much smaller proportion of the population (10 per cent or less), 
though this is still large compared to Japan and Korea (where 1  per  cent and 
0.3 per cent respectively of the populations are migrants). Nevertheless, in the past 
decade or two these patterns of migrant flows have been changing (Coppel et al. 
2001). Migration into EU countries has been growing, peaking in the early 1990s 
with the increased migration from Eastern European countries and a larger number 
of asylum seekers. Historically strict migration restrictions in Japan have been eased 
somewhat as that country confronts economic challenges associated with its 
changing demographics.     




Figure A.1  Australians born overseas by region of birth 
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Data source: ABS, Australian Historical Population Statistics, cat. no. 3105.0.65.001. 
Figure A.2  Immigrants in OECD countries by country of residence 





































































































































































































































Data source: OECD, Database on Immigrants and Expatriates.     





Though more difficult to measure, the Australian population overseas may also play 
an important role in Australia’s society. Reliable data are hard to pin down. One 
reason is that the notion of an expatriate community is not precise. The oft-quoted 
figure is that on any given day as many as one million Australian citizens are 
overseas, of which around three-quarters are long-term foreign residents and the 
balance are short-term visitors.1 More accurate data are available for expatriates 
defined as those residing outside of their country of birth (figure A.3). Around 
346,000 Australian-born people were residing in other OECD countries around the 
year 2000 (Dumont and Lemaitre 2005).2 
Figure A.3  Expatriates living in other OECD countries by country of birth 






































































































































































































































Data source: Author’s calculations based on OECD, Database on Immigrants and Expatriates. 
                                              
1 These data reflect Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade consular estimates of the number of 
Australian citizens abroad (DFAT 2002, 2004). 
2 Nevertheless, these two sets of estimates appear to be broadly consistent. Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade estimates suggest around 550,000 Australians are resident in Western Europe, 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, North America or New Zealand. While census data show 
346,000 Australian-born people resident in OECD countries, these data are broadly reconciled by 
noting that one-quarter of Australians were not born in Australia and among foreign-resident 
Australian citizens the number born overseas is likely to be larger. For example, just over half of 
emigrants permanently departing Australia in recent years were born overseas (Hugo et al 2001).     




Whereas Australia’s migrant population is unusually large, Australia’s expatriate 
population is unusually small. Expressed as a fraction of the Australian population, 
the number of Australian-born people residing in other OECD countries amounts to 
less than 2 per cent of the Australian population (figure A.3). By contrast, many 
European countries have expatriate communities that are two or three times as large 
and in some cases far larger. Only Japan and the United States have smaller 
expatriate communities than Australia, relative to their population. 
Figure A.4  Where do Australians come from and where do they go? 
Thousand people 































































































































































































Data source: OECD, Database on Immigrants and Expatriates. 
While Australia’s migrant and expatriate communities differ markedly in size, they 
share some characteristics. One feature is that migrants’ countries of origin are 
similar to expatriates’ countries of destination. The United Kingdom is both the 
most common source and most common destination, and other European countries 
such as Italy and Greece are also popular (figure A.4). This two-way migration is 
not unique; inward and outward migrant populations are positively correlated across 
the OECD.     





Another characteristic that Australia’s migrant and expatriate communities share is 
that they are highly educated (table A.1). In most OECD countries, migrants have 
lower educational attainment than the locally-born population. Notable exceptions 
are Canada, New Zealand and Australia, where skill plays a larger role in the 
migration programme.3 In most other OECD countries the majority of new arrivals 
are linked to family reunion. For example, in the United States and France this is the 
motivation for around three-quarters of new arrivals (Coppel et al. 2001). In 
Australia, 70 per cent of the annual migrant intake currently comes through the 
skilled migration programme, and a larger share of the migrant population is tertiary 
qualified than in any other OECD country.  
Table A.1  Educational attainment of Australian migrants and expatriates 













Australian born and resident  46  16  39 
Foreign-born Australian residents  39  19  42 
Australian-born residents of other OECD 
countries  18 38  44 
Source: OECD, Database on Immigrants and Expatriates. 
A.2 Trade   
Australia’s trade has risen rapidly in recent decades accompanying declines in 
tariffs and shipping costs and the development of trading ties with Asian countries. 
This has reversed the trend towards smaller trade flows evident in the first half of 
the 20
th century (figure A.5). With the exception of the wool boom in the early 
1950s (associated with the Korean war), trade as a proportion of Australia’s GDP is 
at its highest level since the end of the First World War. Australia’s patterns of trade 
have also shifted over the past few decades. The United Kingdom and Ireland 
accounted for 18  per  cent of Australian merchandise trade in 1970 but just 
5  per  cent in 2000. Over the same period, the proportion of Australia’s trade 
undertaken with Asia increased from 37 per cent to 56 per cent (excluding countries 
formerly part of the USSR).  
                                              
3 Greece and Italy are other examples where immigrants have better educational attainment, but 
this reflects the lower qualifications of the locally-born labour force.     




Despite this trend towards greater openness, trade plays a smaller role in the 
Australian economy than in most other OECD economies. Only the large, diverse 
and relatively self-sufficient economies of Japan and the United States trade 
significantly less as a share of GDP than Australia (figure A.6). Geography likely 
explains why Australia trades so little. Unlike most other developed economies, 
Australia is a long way from all other developed economies. It is situated half a 
world away from the large markets in Europe and the United States. The trip from 
Sydney to Wellington, the capital of Australia’s nearest developed neighbour, 
passes over 2300 km of open water. A similar length trip from Paris to Moscow 
passes over four other countries and 140 million people. Australia’s isolation raises 
its trade costs. The puzzle, perhaps, is why despite these high trade costs Australia 
trades so much. Previous studies suggest that Australia’s bilateral trade is greater 
than would be expected after taking account of its remoteness from trading partners 
(Battersby and Ewing 2005, Guttman and Richards 2005). 
Figure A.5  Australia’s international trade, 1900-01 to 2005-06 

















Data source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian System of National Accounts, 2005-06, 
Cat. no. 5204.0; Butlin (1977).     





Figure A.6  Merchandise trade in OECD countries, 2000 





































































































































































































































Data source: NBER-UN World Trade Data; IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2006. 
Australia’s isolation also affects the direction of its trade. Remoteness from Europe 
and the United States means that Australia trades more with (relatively) near 
neighbours. Australia’s largest trading partners are Japan, the United States and 
China, but this is because they are such large economies. The effect of remoteness 
is more clearly seen if these trade flows are expressed as a percentage of 
trading-partner GDP.  By this metric, Australia’s leading trading partners are closer 
to home: Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Samoa and New Zealand (figure A.7). 
A.3 Foreign  investment 
The stock of foreign direct investment into Australia has risen steadily over recent 
decades, doubling from 15 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 30 per cent in 2006 
(figure A.8). Over the same period, Australian investment abroad grew from 3 per 
cent to 28 per cent of GDP. This has closely mirrored foreign investment trends 
elsewhere, with the aggregate stock of foreign investment increasing from 6 per 
cent of world GDP in 1980 to 24 per cent in 2005.  
     




Figure A.7  With whom does Australia trade? 
Total merchandise trade (imports plus exports), 2000 
By value 
US$ billion 











































































































































































































Data source: NBER-UN World Trade Data; IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2006. 
Figure A.8  Australia’s foreign direct investment, 1980 to 2006 












Australian direct investment abroad (outward position)
Direct investment in Australia (inward position)
 
Data source: ABS, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position, cat. no. 5302.0, December 
2006; ABS, National Accounts: National Income Expenditure and Product, cat. no. 5206.0, December 2006.     





Whereas Australia trades less than most other OECD countries, its level of foreign 
investment is similar to many other OECD countries (figure  A.9). Many of 
Australia’s largest trading partners are also key investment partners (figure A.10). 
The United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand and Japan account for 
72 per cent of direct investment into Australia and 81 per cent of direct investment 
out of Australia. There are two significant problems with the investment data. 
Where foreign investment is directed to companies registered in financially 
convenient locations, such as Bermuda, it is not possible to identify the countries in 
which the physical investment occurs. A more fundamental problem is that different 
countries use different criteria and data sources to record foreign investment. For 
transactions between OECD countries, each investment stock is reported by both 
the host and source country. The error bars in figure A.10 show that there are 
typically very large differences between these reports. 
Figure A.9  Foreign direct investment into and out of OECD countries, 2000 
Per cent of GDP 
Inward stock  Outward stock 






























































Data source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2006.     




Figure A.10  Where do Australians invest, and who invests in Australia?a 
Billion US dollars 















































































































































































































a The figure shows investment stocks in the year closest to 2000 for which data are available, originally 
derived from data reported to the OECD by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Error bars shows another 
estimate of the same investment stock, derived from data reported to the OECD by the partner country’s 
statistics bureau where these data are also available. 
Data source: OECD, International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, 1992-2003. 
 
     




B  The gravity equation 
This appendix outlines why trade flows between countries should follow a gravity 
equation pattern. The discussion is technical, but provides strong guidance on how 
the gravity equation can be implemented to provide consistent estimates of the 
effects of migration on trade flows and how reliable comparative static analysis can 
be undertaken. 
B.1  Why a gravity equation? 
The standard explanation for the gravity equation based on properties of 
expenditure systems follows the work of Anderson (1979), and is further developed 
in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Feenstra (2004) and Baldwin (2006). The 
following discussion most closely follows Baldwin (2006). 
The goal is to develop a theory of how the trade flows between economies are 
affected by the size of the economies and the transport costs involved with trading 
between them. The successful theory should help to explain why there is so much 
more trade between states within a country than there is between countries, and why 
there is so much more trade between Australia and New Zealand than between the 
Netherlands and Ireland (as discussed in chapter 2). 
To focus attention on the role of transport costs, it is assumed that people in 
different countries all have the same tastes and that these tastes are homothetic. A 
consequence of homothetic preferences is that if all prices are the same in two 
countries then consumption of each good will be in proportion to these countries’ 
incomes. More specifically, consumers are assumed to have preferences expressed 
by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function. An implication of this 
assumption is that consumers like variety so much that they want to consume at 
least a little of all goods available regardless of the price. 
While consumers in all countries are the same, it is assumed that different countries 
produce entirely different products so that consumers elsewhere in the world have 
to import these products. This specialisation of production together with consumers’ 
desire for variety provides the motivation for international trade. However, the price 
that producers receive for their goods abroad will in part be required to cover 
transport costs and this curbs international trade. This sort of model is best suited as     




an explanation for trade in non-homogenous goods and this raises questions as to 
what the likely errors are in applying the model to homogenous goods or where 
there are non-traded goods. 
Now for some notation. Suppose that a country i produces Ni different varieties of 
goods. Assuming consumers find each of these varieties equally desirable and the 
transport costs between the two countries and production costs in country i are the 
same for all varieties, then all of the varieties from country i should arrive in 
country j with the same price, pij, and in the same quantity, cij. The total value of 
imports, Mij, into country j from country i is just the sum of expenditure on all of 
these varieties  ij ij i ij c p N M = . Since each variety is only produced in one country the 
imports of a variety in country j must equal the exports of a variety from country i. 
The remainder of the exercise is to find the prices pij that result in the export supply 
equalling the import demand. 
Import demand 
Import demand depends only upon the relative prices of goods from different 
countries and the total amount consumers spend, denoted Ej. This observation that 
relative prices matters seems simple enough but, in fact, ends up being the most 
difficult part of the estimation of the gravity equation and, as was discussed in the 
text, has caused trouble with empirical trade modelling in the past. Given the 
assumption that consumer preferences take the constant elasticity of substitution 
form, and that the value of a country’s consumption is equal to the value of a 
country’s production, it can be shown that demand in country j for each good 































k j p N    (1) 
Here the variable Δj is an index of the landed prices of all goods that are available 
for consumption in country j. Adding up the value of all goods imported by country 













N E M  (2) 
The number σ is the assumed elasticity of substitution between goods in 
consumption, which is an indication of how willing consumers are to switch 
between goods when prices change. For example, if this takes the value 1, 
consumers choose to spend the same share of their income on all goods. In the     




context of global trade it seems reasonable to assume that generally consumers can 
find close substitutes for most products, so that σ>1. 
Transport costs 
The simplest way to include transport costs is to assume that that they can be 
represented as a mark-up over producer prices that is borne by the exporter and 
fully passed through to the consumer. We assume the relationship between the 
prices, pi, the producer receives and the prices the consumer in country j pays is 
given by  i ij ij p T p = , where Tij captures the costs of transporting goods from country 
i to country j. Here Tij takes the value 1 for trade within countries and is otherwise 
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p N E M  (3) 
Balanced trade 
The equation above contains all of the structure of the model.  The problem is that 
the number of varieties produced in each country and their producer prices are not 
observable. A way around this is to apply the equilibrium condition that the total 
value of goods bought from country i, both locally and from abroad, is equal to that 
country’s GDP. The whole system is closed by the assumption that each country’s 
trade is balanced — that is, each country’s total imports and exports are equal and 
total expenditure, Ej, is equal to total production, Yj. 





























σ  , where Y is the total of world 
GDP, and substituting the solution for 
ο − 1
i i p N  into the import equation yields the 
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The derivation of the gravity equation is complete.  However, one final result will 
prove useful below.  Substituting the 
ο − 1
i i p N  back into the definition of Δj reveals 
the similarity between these terms. 


























   (5) 
What does it all mean? 
The gravity equation states that imports between any two countries will tend to 
increase in proportion to the size of each of the partner economies and should 
decline as a function of transport costs for those imports. But this was already 
known. What extra information has the theory bought? 
The theory shows that trade between two countries is affected by trade costs with 
other countries. The additional variables Δj and Ωi are composites of world trade 
costs. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) call them the ‘multilateral resistance’ to 
bilateral trade. The equation shows that if country j faces larger transport costs in 
importing from all countries, then Δj will be smaller and that country will tend to 
import more from any partner country than would be predicted based only on 
bilateral trade costs. In this sense, Δj can be considered to be a measure of the 
openness of country j to imports. Similarly, if country i faces larger transport costs 
in exporting to all countries then Ωi will be smaller and the country will tend to 
export more to any partner country than would otherwise be predicted based only on 
bilateral trade costs. Ωi can be considered a measure of the access of local firms to 
foreign markets. 
These two terms go some way to solve the puzzle of why Australia trades so much 
with New Zealand. Both countries are far from the rest of the world so while 
transport costs between the two countries are high, there are not other markets 
available for them to trade with more cheaply. Moving down from the national to 
the regional level, these same two terms explain at least part of the reason that a 
large country, like the United States, trades so little with the rest of the world: 
American consumers have such a wide variety of goods available within easy reach 
that the imperative to look outwards is lessened.     




B.2 Multilateral  resistance 
The theory shows that the relative prices of goods available from other countries 
(multilateral resistance) affects the level of bilateral imports. Ignoring these prices 
may bias the estimates of all other terms in the gravity equation because it is likely 
the omitted multilateral resistance terms are correlated with the transport cost 
variables. 
Four solutions have been proposed to address this problem. The first solution comes 
from observing that the two multilateral resistance terms separately describe 
characteristics of the exporter and importer. For this reason, the simplest way to 
avoid the omitted variable bias in estimating the coefficients of the gravity equation 
is to include two full sets of dummy variables for importer and exporter. A second 
solution is to include in the regression explanatory variables that are likely to be 
correlated with the omitted multilateral resistance terms. These are commonly 
termed ‘remoteness’ indicators and generally involve some form of averaging of 
distances to trading partners using weights based on the size of each trading 
partner’s economy. A third solution is to include estimates of these multilateral 
price indices directly. 
The fourth solution is to notice that the gravity model actually provides enough 
structure to construct these multilateral resistance terms (Anderson and van 
Wincoop 2003). When trade costs are symmetric a simplifying solution to (4a) and 
(5) is Δi=Ωi. The whole system can be estimated by first estimating the coefficients 
on the trade cost terms in the absence of multilateral resistance, solving for the 
implied multilateral resistances, then making better guesses at the trade cost terms 
that are consistent with these resistances, and so forth using a customised 
optimisation routine. 
In practice it is possible to use a Taylor approximation by assuming world trade is 
close to a simple case, and then making a linear correction to approximate the actual 
multilateral resistance to trade (Baier and Bergstrand 2006). This section illustrates 
their approximation technique starting from the simple case where transport costs 
and information barriers are all zero. In the absence of transport costs the 
multilateral resistance must be the same in all countries and a solution to the system 
of equations is Tij=Δj




i  by taking a first-order Taylor approximation with respect to 
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Substituting this equation into (7) gives: 
∑∑ ∑
== =













ln ln ln θ θ θ    (10) 
The advantage of the Taylor approximation is that equation (10) can now be 
substituted into the gravity equation and estimated directly using knowledge of 
distance, migrants stocks, and a variety of other variables that affect trade costs.  
) ln ln ln )(ln 1 ( ln ln ln
11 1 1 ∑∑ ∑ ∑
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A second approximation starts from the simple case where all economies are of 
equal size and face equal transport costs and information barriers and this leads to 
estimation of each country’s multilateral resistance to trade as a simple average, 
rather than a GDP-weighted average, of the indicator of trade barriers with all 
countries. 
This first-order approximation technique is easier to implement than the customised 
optimisation routine proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Baier and 
Bergstrand (2006) show that this approximation produces very similar transport cost 
estimates because the higher-order terms in the Taylor series are largely 
uncorrelated with the remaining terms in the gravity equation, so that the estimation 
bias resulting from omitting these terms is small.     




B.3  Estimation and comparative static analysis 
The theory in the previous two sections provides broad guidance for estimation of a 
gravity-style equation within chapter 3 of the paper. The key implications are that: 
(i) consistent estimates of the parameters in the gravity equation can best be 
obtained by including origin and destination fixed effects; and (ii) where this is not 
possible, multilateral forms of the variables used to proxy for transport costs 
(distance, contiguity, colonial ties and common language) do a good job of 
controlling for each trading partner’s remoteness. With this guidance in mind, the 
first technique is employed in section 3.1 to model bilateral trade flows while the 
second technique is employed in section 3.2 to also look at the effects on total trade 
flows. While theory guides that analysis, the approach in those sections is 
essentially empirical. 
In this section the theory is taken literally. A literal interpretation of the theory 
permits comparative static analysis of the effects of changing the number of 
migrants in one country on trade flows between all other countries. That is, it is 
possible to calculate the multilateral resistances to trade and use these to describe 
how additional migrants would affect trade flows if the theory were correct. The 
approach taken involves three steps. 
1.  Estimate trade costs, (1-σ)lnTij, between every pair of countries. 
2.  Construct a matrix, B = [Bij], whose entries are GDP-weighted trade costs, 
θjTij
(1-σ), and find the unique vector of multilateral resistances Ω=[Ωi] that solves 
Ω=BΩ
-, where Ω
-=[1/Ωi] (based on equation 5 above and the assumption of 
symmetric trade costs). 
3.  Use the coefficients estimated in step 1 to recalculate trade costs under different 
scenarios, and step 2 to recalculate multilateral resistances. 
In the first step trade costs are estimated from the gravity equation using ordinary 
least squares regression. To check the robustness of the results three approaches are 
used: estimation with origin and destination fixed effects (12a); estimation using the 
GDP-weighted first-order approximations to multilateral resistance (12b) as 
described in the previous subsection; and estimation using simply-weighted 
first-order approximations (12c). 
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where eij is a stochastic error and trade costs, Tij, are given by: 
)) share   s exporter' ln( ) share   s importer' (ln( distance ln ln ij ij 2 1 + + = α α ij ij T  
The migrant share variable used here differs from that in chapter 3 in three ways. 
First, the migrant share variables are defined to be the bilateral number of migrants 
divided by the total resident population ignoring any migrants born outside the 
OECD. Second, because it is necessary for trade costs to be symmetric in order to 
apply the theory, the elasticity of imports to migrant and expatriate populations are 
forced to be equal. Finally, calculations of multilateral resistance are affected by 
estimates of internal trade costs. Internal distances are calculated based on land area 
(see appendix C), while the migrant share variables are coded as 100 per cent, to 
reflect the idea that trade costs within countries are not affected by the country of 
birth of their residents. 
Regression results are shown in table B.1. All three models show that a 10 per cent 
increase in the number of migrants from a particular country tends to increase 
bilateral trade with the migrants’ country of birth by around 1 per cent. However, 
the first form of the multilateral migrant share variable, using GDP-weights, 
explains a much larger share of the variation in trade than does the second form, 
using simple weights. 
Table B.1 Regression  resultsa 
  Model with 
fixed effects 
Multilateral 
 form 1 
Multilateral 
form 2
 I  II  III 
ln distance  -0.891*** 
(0.048)   
ln importer’s share + ln exporter’s share  0.104*** 
(0.012)   






multilateral (ln importer’s share + 





n 755  755  755 
Country of residence fixed effects  Yes     
Country of birth fixed effects  Yes     
R
2 0.842  0.649  0.315 
Standard error  0.593  0.851  1.188 
a Standard errors calculated using the White-robust estimator are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels.     




The second step is to calculate the multilateral resistances implied by these trade 
costs. Baier and Bergstrand (2006) show that these multilateral resistances are the 
fixed point of the contraction mapping  Ω − + Ω Ω
− ) 1 ( z zB a , where  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ z . 
The third and final step is to recalculate transport costs and multilateral resistances 
for alternative scenarios and then calculate their effects on total international trade 
volumes. Two scenarios are considered. 
The first set of scenarios model the effects of a single country choosing to increase 
its migrant intake. This involves increasing by 10 per cent the number of migrants 
living in a particular country from all countries of birth. With a bilateral elasticity of 
trade to migrant populations of around 0.1 (table B.1) a naïve prediction, ignoring 
the effects on the multilateral resistance to trade, would be that trade in the 
migrants’ country of residence would increase by around 1 per cent. 
In reality, migrants increase trade with their country of birth partly by reducing 
trade with other countries. Figure B.1 shows estimates of the effects on a country’s 
total trade flows from increasing the number of migrants living in that country after 
taking into account the changes in multilateral resistance. The effects vary from 
country to country. For countries like Canada that trade heavily with nearby 
neighbours, any increase in trade due to an increase in the local migrant population 
comes about mainly by diverting trade from alternative international destinations. In 
more remote countries like Japan or Australia that have few nearby neighbours and 
trade relatively little, most of the increase in trade due to an increase in the local 
migrant population comes about at the expense of internal trade, so that total 
international trade volumes increase quite strongly. In an average OECD country, 
the effect from increasing the local migrant population by 10 per cent is to increase 
that country’s trade volumes by 0.6 per cent. Another way to think about this is that 
when the local population of migrants increases, a little less than half of the increase 
in bilateral trade with their country of birth typically comes about at the expense of 
trade with other countries.     




Figure B.1  First scenario: Migrant populations increase in a single country 


































































































































































































1.0% Fixed effects estimation Multilateral form 1 Multilateral form 2
Data source: Author’s calculations. 
The second scenario models the effects that may result from the ongoing trend 
towards the circulation of people across the borders of developed countries. It 
involves increasing by 10 per cent the number of migrants living in all countries 
from all countries of birth. Since this scenario increases both the number of 
migrants and the number of expatriates, a naïve prediction based on an elasticity of 
trade of 0.1 would be that trade in all countries would increase by around 2 per cent. 
Again, the naïve prediction overstates the effect that migrants have on each 
country’s trade flows. In this scenario bilateral trade increases because of the 
increase in the number of migrants living in both the importing and exporting 
countries, with effects as in figure B.1, but this is partly offset as a result of the 
number of migrants in other countries also increasing. Figure B.2 shows that the net 
effect is to increase the total trade in an average OECD country by a little less than 
1 per cent. As in figure B.1, the effects vary from country to country.     




Figure B.2  Second scenario: Migrant populations increase in all countries 


































































































































































































Fixed effects estimation Multilateral form 1 Multilateral form 2
Data source: Author’s calculations. 
There are two caveats to these results. First, accurate comparative static analysis 
would require data on migrants living in all countries in the world, but data 
limitations mean that the model ignores trade and migration with all countries 
outside the OECD. Second, other factors besides distance tend to curtail trade 
between countries by more than trade within countries. The first effect means that 
the graphs above tend to overstate the effect that migrants have on total trade flows. 
The bilateral increase that migrants induce in trade between their country of 
residence and country of birth is also partly at the expense of trade with countries 
outside the OECD. The second effect means that the graphs above tend to 
understate the effect that migrants have on total trade flows. In reality, trade within 
countries is larger than this model assumes, so that more of the bilateral increase in 
trade between migrants’ country of residence and country of birth is at the expense 
of trade within countries. The balance of these errors in the analysis is unclear. 
     




     




C  Data definition and sources 
Bilateral trade, investment and migration cross-section 
Corruption: Data were taken from Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index, 2006. A higher score indicates lower corruption perceptions. 
Distance: Great-circle distances in kilometres between the largest cities in each 
country were obtained from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales (http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm). Internal 
distances within countries were estimated by  π / area   land 67 . 0  (Head and Mayer 
2002). The same dataset provided indicators of contiguity (two countries sharing a 
common land border), common language (two countries sharing a language spoken 
by at least 9  per  cent of the population), historical colonial ties, and whether a 
country is landlocked or an island. Belgium was used to represent 
Belgium-Luxembourg. 
Foreign direct investment stocks: Foreign direct investment stocks (inward and 
outward) were sourced from the OECD’s International Direct Investment Statistics 
Yearbook 1992-2003. In many cases data were missing. Two steps were taken to 
produce the largest possible data sample. First, inward and outward foreign direct 
investment stock data are used for the nearest available year to 2000, searching up 
to 3 years either side. Data are expressed in US dollars in the prevailing exchange 
rate in that year. Second, for the subset of investment stocks between OECD 
countries both inward and outward investment should be separately reported for 
each country pair. For this subset, instead of taking data from the nearest available 
year, data were averaged across reports of inward and outward investment in 2000 
where both were available, and missing data were replaced with reports of the 
corresponding stock where only one observation was available. This harmonised 
dataset was used where only OECD countries were considered. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) and population: Estimates of GDP in current US 
dollars and population for the cross-section analysis were sourced from the IMF 
World Economic Outlook, September 2006. Where this data was unavailable for 
particular countries and years, data were sourced from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators. Failing these two sources, population data were sourced     




from Maddison (2003), while GDP was estimated based on the GDP per capita of 
the nearest available year. 
Legal origins: Each country’s legal system is categorised as of British, French, 
German, Socialist or Scandinavian origin, as described in La Porta et al. (1999). 
Migration: Populations of migrants within OECD countries were obtained from the 
OECD Immigrants and Expatriates Database, as detailed in Dumont and Lemaître 
(2005). These are drawn from each member country’s census closest to the year 
2000 and migrants are identified by country of birth (exceptions are Germany where 
data are based on a household survey, and Korea and Japan where data are based 
upon nationality rather than country of birth). Where the former Czechoslovakia, 
former Yugoslavia and former USSR were indicated as countries of birth these were 
disaggregated in proportion to the average shares across countries for which data 
were available. Switzerland was aggregated with Liechtenstein and Monaco with 
France. The education variables used are the number of people with each level of 
educational attainment (tertiary, upper secondary, less than upper secondary) as a 
share of the working-age population reporting their educational attainment.  
Tariffs: Data on tariffs were obtained from the World Bank’s Bilateral Tariff Data, 
as detailed in Bouët et al. (2004). These data are provided at the 6-digit Harmonised 
System (HS6) level based on simple averages of line-item tariffs and take account 
of both ad valorem tariffs and the ad valorem equivalent of specific tariffs. The 
current paper uses a simple average across HS6 classes. Missing data are filled 
using the average for that importer, and the indicator is used only in models that 
include importer dummy variables. 
Trade flows: International trade flows by commodity were obtained from the 
NBER-UN World Trade Data, as outlined in Feenstra et al. (2004). Missing US 
export and Indian import data for 2000 were replaced with the corresponding data 
for 1999. China was aggregated with China Free Trade Zone and China Macau 
SAR.  
Trade flows by differentiation of goods: Trade in goods was aggregated from 
three and four-digit SITC level into three categories: ‘non-homogeneous’; 
‘exchange-quoted homogeneous’; and ‘publication-quoted homogeneous’ based on 
Rauch (1999). Because ambiguity resulted from aggregation of commodities, both 
‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ classifications were provided, with the latter using a 
more liberal definition of non-homogeneous goods. The results in the current paper 
use the conservative definition; results using the liberal definition are similar and 
are available from the author on request.     




Trade in services: Trade in services was taken from the OECD trade database. 
Where available, the data used were averages of trade flows reported by the 
importer and exporter. 
Openness analysis 
Remoteness: Remoteness was calculated as the GDP-weighted geometric average 
great-circle distance between each country’s main city. Nominal market exchange 
rate GDP weights were calculated based on the Penn World Table 6.2. 
Tariff index: A tariff index was obtained from the Institute for Economic 
Freedom’s Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report 2006 (indicator 4A). 
Where historical data are missing these are back-cast from the following period’s 
observation using ordinary least squares regression. Data from 2004 were used to 
represent 2005. A higher score indicates less restrictive tariffs. 
Trade openness: Openness data, measured as merchandise imports plus exports as 
a share of GDP, were sourced from the World Bank World Development Indicators, 
2006. The same source was used for land area (in square kilometres), population 
and the total number of migrants as a share of the population. 
     




Table C.1  Summary of variable names and definitions 
Variable name  Definition 
Bilateral trade and investment 
lagged trade  Bilateral trade in 1970 in the same class of goods as the dependent 
variable, except as otherwise noted   
lagged investment
a  Bilateral direct investment stock in 1990  
importer’s share (exporter’s 
share/ host’s share / source’s 
share) 
The percentage of the importing (exporting/host/source) country’s 
population that are migrants from a particular country of birth 
importer’s share0 (exporter’s 
share0 / host’s share0 / source’s 
share0) 
Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if the importing (exporting/host/source) 
country contains no migrants from a particular country of birth  
ln share  The average of ln(importer’s share) and ln(exporter’s share),  
or ln(host’s share) and ln(source’s share) 
importer’s total share (exporter’s 
total share) 
The percentage of the importing (exporting) country’s population that are 
migrants 
tertiary educated share 
(secondary educated share) 
The percentage of working-age migrants that have attained a bachelor’s 
degree (have only completed secondary education), averaged across 
importing and exporting countries   
FDI1990
a  The sum of the inward and outward direct investment stocks in 1990  
FDI in
a  Inward direct investment stock in 2000  
FDI out
a  Outward direct investment stock in 2000  
distance  The distance separating the main cities of two countries 
contiguity  Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if countries share a land border 
colony  Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if one country colonised the other 
language  Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if more than 9 per cent of both 
countries’ populations speak a common language  
legal origin  Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if countries share a common legal 
origin 
tariff Simple  average  tariff across HS6 classes 
corruption index  A higher index indicates lower perceived corruption 
mass  The product of two countries’ GDPs  
masspc  The product of two countries’ GDPs per capita  
island  The number of countries in a pair that are islands 
landlocked  The number of countries in a pair that are landlocked 
multilateral(x)  As described in chapter 2 
host remoteness (source 
remoteness) 
GDP-weighted average distance from the FDI host country (FDI source 
country) to all other countries 
improvement in remoteness  GDP-weighted average difference in distance from the source country and 
the host country to each consumer market wherever the host is closer 
than the source to a consumer market 
host gdp (source gdp)  GDP of the FDI host country (FDI source country)  
host gdppc (source gdppc)  GDP per capita of the FDI host country (source country) 
Openness 
total share  Percentage of the population that are migrants 
population Total  population 
land area  Total land area 
remoteness  GDP-weighted average distance to all other countries 
tariff index  A higher index indicates less restrictive tariffs 
a In some cases, the analysis uses the closest year for which data are available.     
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